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BISMARCK 


AND 


GERMAN  UNITY 


BISMARCK 


AND 

GERMAN  UNITY 

A  HISTORICAL  OUTLINE 


BY 


MUNROE  SMITH 

Doctor  of  Laws  of  Gottingen  University 
Professor  of  Roman  Law  and  Comparative  Jurisprudence 
in  Columbia  University 


Neto  gavk 

PUBLISHED  FOR  THE  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  PRESS  BY 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

LONDON:  MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Ltd. 

1898 


All  rights  reserved 


Copyright,  1898 

By  THE  EVENING  POST  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 


Copyright,  1898 

By  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 


Nortoooti 

J.  S.  Cushion  &  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith 
Norwood  Mass.  U.S.A. 


PREFACE 


This  sketch  of  Prince  Bismarck’s  work 
was  published,  immediately  after  his  death, 
in  the  New  York  Evening  Post  and  (in 
part)  in  The  Nation.  It  is  reprinted  with 
little  change  and  with  few  additions.  It 
would  have  been  easy  to  expand  the 
sketch  into  a  portly  volume,  —  easier,  in¬ 
deed,  than  it  was  originally  to  keep  it 
within  its  present  limits,  —  but  it  is  be¬ 
lieved  that  such  a  summary  as  is  here 
offered  will  be  useful  to  those  who  are  too 
busy  to  read  many  thick  books,  and  to 
those  who  wish  a  more  sharply  outlined 
impression  than  is  readily  obtained  from  a 
mass  of  details.  It  will  be  most  useful, 
however,  if  it  awakens  in  some  readers 
the  interest  in  a  great  career  which  the 
writer  has  felt  for  a  quarter  of  a  century, 
and  if  it  sets  them  to  reading  other  and 
fuller  histories. 

MUNROE  SMITH 

Columbia  University,  September  6,  1898 
v 

5^9300 


ttVBB 


Jirtfiplace.  Paternal  ncf  aternal  ancestry.  Social 
position.  Education.  Life  in  the  country.  Entry 
into  public  life,  1847 . |  1-4 

lerman  politics,  1815-48.  Revolution  of  1848.  Pop.-) 
ular  unity  movement.  Frankfort  Parliament.  Aus¬ 
tria  or  Prussia?  Leadership  offered  to  Prussia. 
Prussian  refusal.  Princely  movement  for  unity, 
1849-50.  Erfurt  Parliament.  Olmiitz  .  .  4-1 1 

Bismarck’s  Toryism.  Attitude  toward  the'unity  move- 
.*  ments.  Envoy  at  Frankfort.  Change  of  views* 

The  Frankfort  correspondence.  Hostility;  to  Ausw 
tria.  A  German  policy.  Ambassador  to  Russia  ij-18 

Tlliam  I.  Reform  of  the  army.  Opposition  of  the 
|  Diet.  Bismarck  ambassador  to  France.  Bismarck 
minister-president,  1862.  William’s  distrust  of  Bis-* 

•  marck.  Bismarck’s  management  of  William  .  ip-21 

% 

parliamentary  conflict.  Foreign  policy,  1862-66.  Aus¬ 
tria.  Russia.  France . qji-24 

the  Schleswig-Holstein  question.  Revolt  of  the 
duchies,  1848.  London  conference.  London  prof 
|  tocol,  1852.  Danish  aggression,  1863.  Death  of 
the  Danish  king.  Dispute  over  the  succession  .  34-28 


P 


of  courses  in  1863.  The  populaf 
The  unpopular  course.  Bismarck’s  de-» 


russia’s  choice 

?  course.  _  _ _  _  _  _ 

J 

cision.  War  with  Denmark,  1864.  Condominium 
in  Schleswig-Holstein.  How  Austria’s  play  was 

1  .  -  .  ...  -  ,  ,  - * 


5-34 


59S3C0 


CONTENTS 


viii 

PAGES 

Strained  relations  with  Austria.  Convention  of  Gas- 
tein,  1865.  New  dissensions.  The  German  ques¬ 
tion.  The  war  with  Austria,  1866.  Sadowa.  Peace 
of  Prague.  Napoleon’s  interference.  Prussian 
annexations.  The  North  German  confederation. 
Character  of  the  new  union  ....  34-40 

Bismarck’s  unpopularity,  1862-66.  Attempt  on  his 
life.  Reversal  of  sentiment.  Bill  of  indemnity. 
Shifting  of  party  lines . 40-42 

Strained  relations  with  France.  Compensation  de¬ 
manded.  Evidence  of  French  demands  secured. 

Use  made  of  the  evidence  ....  43-46 

Genesis  of  the  Franco-German  war.  The  Luxem¬ 
burg  incident,  1867.  Coalition  against  Germany. 

The  Spanish  candidacy,  1870.  Bismarck’s  part 
in  the  affair.  His  motives.  Leopold’s  acceptance. 
French  demands.  William’s  attitude.  Leopold’s 
withdrawal.  New  French  demands.  France  dis¬ 
posed  to  retreat.  Bismarck  intervenes.  “  Edit¬ 
ing”  the  Ems  despatch.  Effect  of  Bismarck’s 


action . 47-57 

French  expectations.  Attitude  of  South  Germany. 
German  victories.  Peace  of  Frankfort.  The  Ger¬ 
man  empire . 57—61 

The  German  parliament,  1871-90.  The  Centrists. 


The  “culture  conflict.”  The  May  laws,  1873. 
Close  of  the  conflict,  1887.  The  uses  of  adversity. 
Second  attempt  on  Bismarck’s  life.  The  Social 
Democrats.  Repressive  legislation.  Reform  leg¬ 
islation  .  . 61-68 

The  German  army.  The  septennate.  German 
finances.  Project  of  a  tobacco  monopoly.  De¬ 
feat  of  the  project.  A  protective  tariff,  1879.  A 
colonial  policy.  The  Berlin  conference,  1884-85. 
General  results  .......  68-76 


CONTENTS 


IX 


PAGES 

Foreign  relations  of  the  empire,  1871-90.  France. 
Russia.  German- Austrian  alliance,  1879.  The 

triple  alliance,  1882.  Secret  treaty  with  Russia, 

1884 . 76-80 

Bismarck  and  the  old  emperor.  Frederick  III.  Wil¬ 
liam  II.  Ministerial  vs.  imperial  responsibility. 

The  ordinance  of  1852.  The  Windthorst  interview. 


Bismarck’s  enforced  resignation  .  .  .  80-85 

The  quarrel  with  the  emperor.  A  formal  reconcil¬ 
iation.  Bismarck’s  eightieth  birthday.  Death. 
Honors . 86-90 

Personal  characteristics.  Speeches.  Writings.  Qual¬ 
ities  as  a  statesman.  Political  methods  .  .  90-94 

Family . 94-95 

Bismarck  literature . 95-99 


From  the  beginning  of  my  career  I  have  had 
but  the  one  guiding  star:  By  what  means  and  in 
what  way  can  I  bring  Germany  to  unity  ?  and 
in  so  far  as  this  end  has  been  attained:  How 
can  I  strengthen  this  unity  and  increase  it  and 
give  it  such  form  that  it  shall  be  enduringly 
maintained  with  the  free  consent  of  all  coopera¬ 
ting  forces  ?  —  Bismarck  in  the  German  Im¬ 
perial  Diet,  July  9,  1879 


,  BISMARCK 

AND 

GERMAN  UNITY 

Otto  Edward  Leopold  von  Bismarck 
was  born  at  Schonhausen  in  the  Old 
Mark  of  Brandenburg,  province  of  Sax¬ 
ony,  kingdom  of  Prussia,  April  i,  1815. 
He  came  of  a  line  of  country  gentle¬ 
men,  whose  main  business  was  always 
the  care  of  their  estates  in  the  Mark 
and  in  Pomerania,  but  who  incidentally, 
like  most  Brandenburg  gentlemen,  served 
their  princes  in  war  and  sometimes  as 
diplomatists  or  administrative  officials. 
The  record  of  the  family  runs  back  to 
the  thirteenth  century,  and  the  estate 
of  Schonhausen  has  been  in  its  posses¬ 
sion  for  more  than  three  hundred  years. 
On  the  mother’s  side  Bismarck  came 
of  plainer  people,  but  among  these  also 
were  servants  of  the  state.  His  maternal 

B  I 


Birthplace 


Paternal 

ancestry 


Maternal 

ancestry 


2 


BISMARCK 


Social 

position 


Education 


grandfather,  Menken,  was  a  Prussian 
government  clerk  who  rose  under  Fred¬ 
erick  William  III  to  the  rank  of  a 
cabinet  councillor  and  became  a  trusted 
assistant  of  the  great  Baron  Stein. 

The  country  gentlemen  of  Prussia 
held,  in  Bismarck’s  youth,  a  position  not 
unlike  that  of  the  landed  gentry  of  Eng¬ 
land.  They  were  the  governing  class  and 
managed  the  affairs  of  their  districts ; 
and  the  country  squire  who  developed 
an  exceptional  talent  for  administration 
passed  easily  and  naturally  from  the  gov¬ 
ernment  of  his  neighborhood  to  the  ad¬ 
ministration  of  the  province  or  of  the 
kingdom.  By  way  of  preparation  for 
these  duties  and  possibilities,  the  future 
landholder  sometimes  studied  law  and 
even  entered  the  judicial  or  administra¬ 
tive  service  of  the  state,  without  neces¬ 
sarily  intending  to  become  either  an 
advocate  or  a  professional  official.  In 
accordance  with  this  excellent  usage,  the 
young  Bismarck,  at  the  age  of  seventeen, 
was  matriculated  in  the  law  faculty  at 


BISMARCK 


3 


Gottingen  and  spent  three  semesters  as 
a  student  in  that  university  —  but,  if 
Gottingen  traditions  are  to  be  trusted, 
can  not  be  said  to  have  studied  there. 
At  Berlin,  however,  where  he  completed 
his  law  course,  he  must  have  studied ; 
for  he  passed  the  state  examination  with 
credit  and  entered  the  state  service. 
After  one  year’s  work  as  assistant  (Aus- 
cultator )  in  the  city  court  of  Berlin  and 
nearly  three  years’  administrative  service 
as  Referendar  at  Aix-la-Chapelle  and  Pots¬ 
dam,  he  resigned  his  position  and,  at 
the  age  of  twenty-four,  assumed  with 
his  brother  Bernhard  the  care  of  his 
father’s  Pomeranian  estates.  For  eight 
years  the  future  chancellor  of  the  Ger¬ 
man  empire  devoted  himself  to  sheep¬ 
raising  and  grain-growing,  relieving  the 
monotony  of  his  life  by  hard  riding  and 
occasional  hard  drinking,  but  also  by 
hard  reading  and  travel.  In  1845  he 
was  elected  a  member  of  the  Pomeranian 
Diet.  The  death  of  his  father,  in  the 
same  year,  gave  him  the  ancestral  seat 


Life  in  the 
country 
1839-47 


4 


BISMARCK 


Entry  into 
public  life 


German  poli¬ 
tics,  1815-48 


of  Schonhausen  and  carried  him  from 
Pomerania  to  the  Mark.  Here  he  ob¬ 
tained  his  first  administrative  office,  that 
of  superintendent  of  dikes ;  and  here 
also  he  was  elected  to  the  provincial 
Diet;  and  when,  in  1847,  King  Frederick 
William  IV  attempted  to  solve  the  par¬ 
liamentary  question  by  collecting  the 
representatives  of  the  eight  provinces,  Bis¬ 
marck  went  to  Berlin  as  a  member  of 
the  United  Diet.  He  was  only  an 
alternate  delegate;  but  the  proper  repre¬ 
sentative,  as  it  chanced,  fell  ill,  and  Bis¬ 
marck’s  political  career  was  opened. 

It  was  an  uneasy  time  in  Prussia  and 
in  Germany  when  the  United  Diet  came 
together,  and  it  was  soon  to  be  a  stormy 
time.  The  German  people  were  domi¬ 
nated  by  two  aspirations,  popular  sover¬ 
eignty  and  national  unity.  That  these 
objects  were  not  merely  distinct  but  also, 
under  the  conditions  then  existing,  in¬ 
compatible,  the  people  wholly  failed  to 
realize.  The  two  ideas  had  gained  their 


BISMARCK 


5 


hold  upon  the  German  mind  in  the 
same  historic  period  —  that  of  the  first 
French  revolution  and  the  revolutionary- 
wars  (1789-1815).  The  revolution  had 
infected  the  Germans  with  the  democratic 
fever,  and  the  subjugation  and  humilia¬ 
tion  of  Germany  by  Napoleon  had  awak¬ 
ened  a  specific  German  patriotism  and 
shown  the  necessity  of  national  union. 
In  the  war  of  liberation  (1813)  the  Ger¬ 
man  governments,  and  notably  the  gov¬ 
ernment  of  Prussia,  had  appealed  to  both 
of  these  popular  ideas.  They  had  prom¬ 
ised  the  people  liberty  and  unity.  When 
the  victory  was  won,  when  Napoleon  was 
dethroned  and  France  reduced  to  its 
pre-revolutionary  boundaries,  the  German 
governments  broke  their  pledges.  Ger¬ 
many  was  organized,  at  the  Congress  of 
Vienna  (1815),  into  a  loose  confederation 
of  sovereign  states;  and  in  the  majority 
of  these  states,  including  Prussia  and 
Austria,  the  princes  retained  absolute 
power.  The  people  naturally  lost  all 
faith  in  their  rulers  and  began  to  look 


6 


BISMARCK 


Revolution  of 
March,  1848 


to  a  popular  uprising  and  the  establish¬ 
ment  of  popular  sovereignty  as  the  only 
means  of  national  unification.  This  con¬ 
nection  of  ideas  determined  the  creed  of 
both  parties.  As  the  nationalists  were 
nearly  all  Liberals,  and  to  a  great  extent 
Democrats,  so,  by  an  inevitable  antithesis, 
nearly  all  the  Conservatives  were  particu- 
larists,  identifying  the  maintenance  of 
princely  power  with  the  system  of  state 
sovereignty  and  German  disunity.  All 
agitation  in  favor  of  national  unity  was 
punished  as  treason. 

The  paralysis  of  princely  government 
in  1848  gave  the  Liberals  an  unexpected 
opportunity  to  attempt  the  realization  of 
their  programme:  unity  through  liberty. 
The  Paris  insurrection  and  the  dethrone¬ 
ment  of  Louis  Philippe  kindled  the  flame 
of  revolution  throughout  Germany;  and 
everywhere,  at  first,  the  German  revolu¬ 
tionists  achieved  complete  success.  All 
the  German  princes  who  had  thus  far 
retained  absolute  power  gave  or  promised 
constitutions ;  and  those  who  had  already 


BISMARCK 


7 


given  constitutions  appointed  Liberal 
ministers  and  promised  Liberal  reforms. 
Prussia  and  Austria  succumbed  to  the 
popular  movement  as  completely  as  the 
little  states ;  and  Austria,  the  bulwark 
of  conservatism,  was  threatened  with  de¬ 
struction  by  simultaneous  insurrections 
in  Hungary  and  Italy.  Constitutional 
liberty  seemed  assured,  and  the  Liberal 
leaders  had  for  the  moment  a  free  field 
for  their  attempt  to  secure  national  unity. 
A  German  parliament,  elected  by  uni¬ 
versal  suffrage,  met  at  Frankfort  and 
addressed  itself  to  the  task  of  framing 
a  national  constitution  for  a  new  German 
empire. 

It  was  characteristic  of  the  doctrinaire 
spirit  of  the  movement  that  the  central 
and  vital  point  of  the  whole  question  was 
the  last  to  be  considered.  There  were 
in  Germany  two  great  states,  either  of 
which  was  stronger  than  all  the  little 
states  together;  and  the  prime  question 
was:  Which  of  these  two  states,  Prussia 
or  Austria,  shall  have  the  hegemony  in 


Popular 

unity 

movement 


Frankfort 

Parliament 


Austria 

or 

Prussia  ? 


8 


BISMARCK 


Leadership 
offered  to 
Prussia 


the  new  Germany?  But  as  neither  of 
these  states  would  peacefully  submit  to 
the  rule  of  the  other,  the  question  imme¬ 
diately  restated  itself :  Which  of  these 
two  states  is  to  be  excluded  from  the 
new  Germany?  The  answer  could  not 
be  doubtful.  Prussia  was  the  more  mod¬ 
ern  and  progressive  of  the  two  states, 
and  in  the  customs  union  it  had 
brought  all  the  German  states  except 
Austria  into  commercial  unity.  The 
Parliament  finally  excluded  Austria  from 
the  empire,  and  offered  the  imperial 
crown  to  Frederick  William  IV  of  Prus¬ 
sia.  But  this  result  was  not  attained 
until  the  spring  of  1849.  In  1848,  when 
all  the  petty  princes  were  terrorized  by 
the  revolution  and  the  Austrian  empire 
was  struggling  for  existence,  the  scheme 
might  conceivably  have  been  realized. 
In  1849  the  reaction  had  begun:  the 
princes  had  largely  recovered  their  cour¬ 
age  and  reestablished  their  power,  and 
Austria  had  fought  through  the  worst 
of  its  embarrassments.  In  1849,  there- 


BISMARCK 


9 


fore,  the  offer  of  the  imperial  crown  to 
Frederick  William  IV  was  simply  an 
invitation  to  him  to  mobilize  his  army 
and  fight  for  it.  The  success  of  such  a 
venture  was  doubtful ;  and  from  the 
Conservative  point  of  view  the  stake 
was  not  worth  the  risk.  The  Liberals 
in  the  Frankfort  Parliament  had  gained 
the  adhesion  of  the  Democrats  and 
secured  a  majority  only  by  making  the 
constitution  of  the  new  empire  so  demo¬ 
cratic  that  the  emperor  would  have  been 
a  mere  figurehead.  Frederick  William 
of  Prussia  accordingly  refused  the  impe¬ 
rial  crown,  and  the  revolutionary  experi¬ 
ment  was  at  an  end.  The  Liberal 
programme  had  failed,  as  in  the  nature 
of  things  it  was  bound  to  fail.  No  con¬ 
federation  has  ever  been  rebuilt  into  a 
nation  without  the  cement  of  blood. 

For  Prussia,  however,  the  recognition 
of  its  necessary  hegemony  by  the  repre¬ 
sentatives  of  the  German  people  had  a 
certain  moral  value  —  a  value  all  the 
greater  because  the  recognition  was 


Prussian 

refusal 


Princely 
movement, 
for  unity 
1849-50. 


10 


BISMARCK 


Erfurt 

Parliament 


Olmiitz 


tardy  and  reluctant  The  Prussian  gov¬ 
ernment  endeavored  to  utilize  this  ad¬ 
vantage  in  1849  and  1850  by  negotiations 
with  the  North  German  princes.  A 
treaty  of  alliance  was  concluded  with 
Saxony  and  Hanover  for  a  “  restricted 
union  ” ;  nearly  all  the  lesser  states 
accepted  the  proposal ;  and  a  second 
constituent  Parliament  met  at  Erfurt  in 
the  spring  of  1850.  But  the  adhesion  of 
Saxony  and  Hanover  was  not  even  half¬ 
hearted  ;  there  was  no  heart  or  sincerity 
in  it.  These  states  were  simply  tempo¬ 
rizing  with  Prussia.  They  were  really 
averse  to  the  proposed  union  and  were 
engaged  in  simultaneous  negotiations 
with  Austria.  For  a  brief  space,  in 
1850,  Prussia  and  Austria  seemed  likely 
to  come  to  blows  and  the  German  ques¬ 
tion  to  a  solution.  But  Russia  threw  its 
whole  influence  and  threatened  to  throw 
its  whole  force  on  the  side  of  Austria; 
and  Prussia,  in  the  convention  of  Olmiitz, 
November  29,  1850,  yielded  every  point 
in  dispute.  The  old  confederation  was 


BISMARCK 


1 1 

reestablished  in  all  its  old  impotence, 
and  the  Federal  Diet  resumed  its  ses¬ 
sions  at  Frankfort. 

What  was  Bismarck’s  position  on  all 
these  questions?  Towards  the  constitu¬ 
tional  movement  in  Prussia  his  attitude 
was  one  of  bitter  and  uncompromising 
hostility.  In  the  United  Diet  of  1847-48 
he  figured  as  a  Tory  of  the  Tories.  He 
was  more  royalist  than  the  king,  and 
opposed  every  diminution  of  the  kingly 
prerogatives.  When  in  the  .  spring  of 
1848  the  king  promised  a  constitution 
and  the  United  Diet  passed  an  address 
of  thanks,  Bismarck  was  one  of  the  few 
who  voted  against  the  address.  He 
accepted  the  situation,  he  declared,  be¬ 
cause  he  could  not  help  it ;  but  he  was 
not  willing  to  close  his  activity  in  the 
Diet  with  the  lying  assertion  that  he 
was  thankful  for  what  he  was  obliged  to 
regard  as  a  mistake.  When  the  king 
summoned  a  representative  assembly  to 
frame  the  promised  constitution,  Bis- 


Bismarck’s 

Toryism 


12 


BISMARCK 


Attitude 
toward 
the  unity 
movements 


marck  refused  to  stand  for  election. 
When  the  king  dissolved  this  assembly, 
published  a  constitution  of  his  own  and 
ordered  new  elections,  Bismarck  accepted 
a  mandate  as  deputy  in  the  new  Diet;  but 
this  he  did  only  on  the  personal  solici¬ 
tation  of  the  king. 

Toward  the  popular  unity  movement 
his  attitude  was  that  of  an  unfriendly 
critic.  He  approved  the  king’s  refusal 
of  the  imperial  title  offered  by  the  Frank¬ 
fort  Parliament,  because  the  Frankfort 
constitution  would  make  the  emperor 
“  the  vassal  ”  of  the  Radicals.  “  The 
Frankfort  crown,”  Bismarck  said,  “  may 
be  very  brilliant;  but  the  gold  which 
gives  truth  to  its  brilliancy  is  to  be  got¬ 
ten  by  putting  the  Prussian  crown  into 
the  melting  pot.”  Bismarck  sat  in  the 
Erfurt  Parliament,  but  he  saw  clearly  the 
hopelessness  of  its  attempts  and  occu¬ 
pied  himself  in  throwing  cold  water 
upon  the  enthusiasts.  During  the 
Austro-Prussian  disputes  of  1850  he 
voted  with  the  Austrophils  in  the  Prussian 


BISMARCK 


13 


Diet,  and  defended  the  convention  of 
Olmiitz. 

When  the  German  confederation  was 
reestablished,  Frederick  William  IV  sent 
Bismarck  to  the  Frankfort  Diet  as  the 
representative  of  Prussia.  This  appoint¬ 
ment  elicited  hostile  comment.  The 
Frankfort  Diet  was  nothing  but  a  stand¬ 
ing  congress  of  ambassadors  and  the 
appointment  of  a  man  without  diplomatic 
training  was  a  breach  of  Prussian  tradi¬ 
tions.  Upon  the  Prussian  representative  at 
Frankfort,  moreover,  rested  in  large  meas¬ 
ure  the  defence  of  Prussia’s  German 
interests,  and  the  appointment  of  a  pro¬ 
nounced  friend  of  Austria  seemed  likely 
to  result  in  a  sacrifice  of  these  interests. 
Bismarck  undoubtedly  owed  his  appoint¬ 
ment  to  his  legitimist,  or  rather  absolutist, 
attitude  in  Prussian  politics.  His  defence 
of  the  royal  prerogative  had  won  him  the 
confidence  of  the  king.  His  attitude 
towards  Austria  made  his  appointment 
particularly  suitable.  After  Olmiitz,  it 


Envoy  at 
Frankfort 

1851-59 


14 


BISMARCK 


Change  of 
views 


would  have  been  absurd  for  Prussia  to 
send  to  Frankfort  an  ambassador  who  was 
not  persona  grata  to  Austria. 

Bismarck’s  appointment  was  no  error. 
His  attitude  towards  Austria  resulted  in 
no  sacrifice  of  Prussia’s  interests.  His 
support  of  Austria  during  his  parliamen¬ 
tary  career  had  been  dictated  by  party  feel¬ 
ing.  The  Conservatives  rightly  regarded 
Austria  as  the  bulwark  of  conservatism, 
and  Bismarck  was  a  thorough  Conserva¬ 
tive.  At  Frankfort,  however,  he  ceased 
to  be  a  Conservative  and  became  simply 
a  Prussian.  He  found  the  Austrian  in¬ 
fluence  in  the  ascendant  and  saw  that  this 
influence  was  constantly  used  to  thwart 
Prussia’s  plans  and  injure  Prussia’s  pros¬ 
pects.  Before  he  had  been  in  Frankfort 
a  year,  the  adroitness  and  the  persistence 
with  which  he  countered  the  Austrian 
schemes  made  him  persona  ingrata  at 
Vienna,  and  repeated  efforts  were  made  in 
the  following  years  to  secure  his  recall. 

For  this  period  of  Bismarck’s  career  we 
possess  fuller  data  than  for  any  other, 


BISMARCK 


15 


because  the  greater  part  of  his  Frankfort 
correspondence,  including  not  merely  offi¬ 
cial  despatches  but  private  letters  to  the 
Prussian  prime  minister,  has  been  given 
to  the  public.  These  despatches  and  let¬ 
ters  are  of  such  literary  excellence  as  to 
make  them  one  of  the  monuments  of  clas¬ 
sical  German  prose;  of  such  intrinsic  value 
that  no  history  of  the  period  can  be  writ¬ 
ten  without  consulting  them;  and  they 
show  such  breadth  of  view  and  keenness 
of  insight  as  fully  to  explain  the  advance¬ 
ment  of  the  writer  to  the  highest  posi¬ 
tion  in  the  Prussian  state.  The  business 
actually  transacted  in  the  Frankfort  Diet 
was  petty  and  unimportant  to  the  last 
degree;  but  Frankfort  was  a  central 
point  of  European  intrigue,  and  the 
most  vital  questions  of  European  politics 
were  touched  in  Bismarck’s  despatches. 
The  king  and  his  minister-president, 
Manteuffel,  consulted  their  representa¬ 
tive  at  Frankfort  upon  all  leading  ques¬ 
tions  of  state  policy ;  and  his  advice 
seems  commonly  to  have  been  followed. 


The  Frank¬ 
fort  corre¬ 
spondence 


i6 


BISMARCK 


This  was  notably  the  case  during  the  Cri¬ 
mean  war,  when  France,  England  and 
Austria  sought  to  draw  Prussia  into  an 
attitude  of  hostility  to  Russia,  and  Bis¬ 
marck  convincingly  maintained  the  ab¬ 
sence  of  any  Prussian  interest  in  the 
war  and  the  impolicy  of  aiding  Austria. 

Hostility  to  His  Frankfort  experiences  had  caused 
him  to  believe  that,  in  the  existing  con¬ 
dition  of  European  and  German  affairs, 
Austria  was  Prussia’s  natural  enemy. 
He  wrote  in  1856: 

In  every  century  since  the  time  of  Charles  V, 
German  dualism  has  settled  its  relations  by  an  inter¬ 
nal  war,  fought  to  the  finish  ;  and  in  the  present 
century  also  there  will  be  no  other  way  of  setting 
the  clock  of  our  development  at  the  right  hour.  .  .  . 
I  desire  to  express  my  conviction  that  at  no  distant 
time  we  shall  have  to  fight  with  Austria  for  our 
existence. 

And  in  1859,  just  after  the  outbreak  of 
the  Italian  war,  he  wrote  that  the  em¬ 
barrassments  of  Austria  gave  Prussia  an 
exceptional  opportunity  to  readjust  its 
relations  to  Germany ;  that  these  relations 


BISMARCK 


17 


amounted,  for  Prussia,  to  a  disease ;  and 
that  this  disease,  unless  radically  cured  at 
some  such  favorable  moment,  would  have 
to  be  treated,  sooner  or  later,  ferro  et  igni. 
Here  is  already  the  line  of  thought  which 
led  to  the  war  of  1866  and  the  formation 
of  the  North  German  confederation ;  and 
here  is  also,  in  its  first  form,  the  famous 
phrase  Eisen  und  Bint. 

In  the  following  year,  alluding  to 
rumors  of  his  own  leanings  toward  a 
French  alliance,  he  wrote  to  a  friend : 
“  If  I  have  sold  myself,  it  is  to  a  Teutonic 
and  not  to  a  Gallic  devil”;  and  in  an¬ 
other  letter  he  declared  that  he  could  not 
see  why  Prussia  should  shrink  so  coyly 
from  the  idea  of  a  representative  German 
parliament. 

The  letters  last  cited  were  written  from 
St.  Petersburg.  Bismarck’s  hostility  to 
Austria  had  become  so  pronounced  that 
the  Prussian  government,  not  yet  pre¬ 
pared  to  accept  his  policy,  had  deemed  it 
advisable  to  promote  him  out  of  Frank¬ 
fort  and,  as  he  himself  expressed  it,  to 


A  German 
policy 


Ambassador 
to  Russia 
1859-63 


1 8  BISMARCK 

“put  him  on  ice”  on  the  Neva.  Here 
he  remained  as  Prussian  ambassador  for 
three  years. 

William  i  During  the  latter  part  of  Bismarck’s 

(l86l-88) 

term  of  service  at  Frankfort,  King  Fred¬ 
erick  William  IV  had  been  attacked  by 
a  disease  of  the  brain,  and  in  1858  his 
brother,  Prince  William,  had  assumed  the 
regency.  In  1861  Frederick  William 
died,  and  the  prince  regent  became  king. 
Reform  One  of  the  chief  causes  of  Prussia’s  dis- 
earmy  gracefui  submission  at  Olmiitz  was  the 
imperfect  condition  of  its  army ;  and 
King  William,  a  soldier  before  all  things, 
was  resolved  upon  a  thorough  reorgani- 
Opposition  zation  of  “  the  instrument.”j  The  plan 
of  the  Diet  jnvoive(j  a  serious  increase  of  the  budget, 

and  this  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  refused. 
Foreseeing  an  obstinate  conflict,  the  king 
wavered  for  a  time  between  two  courses : 
abdication  or  the  enforcement  of  the  royal 
will  in  spite  of  the  Deputies.  If  he  chose 
the  latter  course,  he  needed  as  premier  a 
man  completely  devoted  to  prerogative, 


BISMARCK 


19 


resolute  in  action  and  fearless  of  conse¬ 
quences  ;  and  there  was  no  man  among 
his  subjects  who  possessed  these  qualities 
in  a  higher  degree  than  his  ambassador 


at  St.  Petersburg.  The  minister  of  war, 
von  Roon,  whom  the  king  liked  and 
trusted  above  all  his  advisers  and  who 
was  a  friend  of  Bismarck,  was  persistent 
in  urging  Bismarck’s  appointment.  I  Early 
in  1862  Bismarck  was  recalled  from  Rus¬ 
sia,  apparently  with  a  view  to  his  becom¬ 
ing  prime  minister;  but  the  king  could 
not  yet  make  up  his  mind  and  Bismarck 
was  sent  to  Paris.  fn  the  autumn  of  the 
same  year  von  Roon  telegraphed :  “  The 
pear  is  ripe”;  and  Bismarck  returned  to 
Berlin  and  was  appointed  president  of  the 
Prussian  mini 


Contemporary  letters  and  memoirs  pub¬ 
lished  in  the  last  few  years  have  made  it 
clear  that  at  this  time  (1862)  King  Wil¬ 
liam  neither  liked  Bismarck  nor  fully 
trusted  him.  The  dislike  was  caused, 
in  part,  by  Bismarck’s  extreme  frankness 
and  frequent  brusqueness  of  speech ;  the 


Bismarck 
ambassador 
to  France 


Minister- 

president 


William's 
distrust 
of  Bismarck 


20 


BISMARCK 


Bismarck's 
management 
of  William 


distrust  was  not  of  Bismarck’s  ability  or 
loyalty  but  of  his  discretion.  Under 
both  sentiments  lay,  as  Erich  Marcks 
has  shrewdly  suggested,  the  natural  an¬ 
tipathy  which  common  sense  feels  toward 
genius. 

Bismarck  was  called  to  the  premier¬ 
ship  because  he  undertook  to  secure  the 
reorganization  of  the  army  in  spite  of 
the  Deputies,  and  because  he  convinced 
the  king  that  this  could  be  done  with¬ 
out  violating  the  constitution.  It  was 
not  William’s  intention  to  abandon  the 
personal  direction  of  Prussia’s  general 
policy.  In  fact,  however,  it  was  Bis¬ 
marck’s  will  and  not  the  king’s  that 
determined  Prussian  action  from  1862 
to  1870  and  German  action  from  1870 
to  1888.  This  result  was  not  reached 
without  friction  nor  without  occasional 
crises.  William  possessed  too  strong  a 
character  to  accept,  without  resistance, 
plans  that  he  only  partially  compre¬ 
hended  and  ventures  of  which  he  could 
not  foresee  the  outcome.  He  was  also. 


BISMARCK 


21 


with  all  his  ambition,  too  conscientious 
a  man  to  do  what  he  thought  wrong. 
Bismarck,  however,  had  a  remarkable 
power  of  lucid  statement  and  of  coercive 
reasoning;  and  when  persuasion  failed, 
he  did  not  hesitate  to  break  the  king’s 
resistance  by  the  irresistible  logic  of 
events.  In  many  cases  William  doubt¬ 
less  failed  to  see  that  the  situation  which 
constrained  him  had  been  deliberately 
created  by  his  minister.  There  can  be 
little  question  that  in  1866  he  as  firmly 
believed  Austria  to  be  the  aggressor  as 
he  believed  France  to  be  the  aggressor 
in  1870.  To  Bismarck,  William’s  re¬ 
luctances  were  often  troublesome ;  but 
they  had  for  Prussia  a  value  which  Bis¬ 
marck  did  not  fail  to  recognize :  they 
minimized  the  impression  of  unscrupu¬ 
lousness  which  the  minister’s  policy  was 
too  apt  to  create. 

During  the  first  four  years  of  Bis¬ 
marck’s  administration,  Prussia’s  internal 
politics  were  extremely  simple  although 


Parliamen¬ 
tary  conflict 
1862-66 


22 


BISMARCK 


Foreign 

policy 

1862-66 


very  stormy.  Each  year  the  Deputies 
refused  to  vote  the  increased  military 
appropriations.  Each  year  the  Diet  was 
dissolved  and  new  elections  ordered. 
Each  new  election  increased  the  anti- 
governmental  majority.  But  the  people, 
even  when  the  agitation  was  hottest,  con¬ 
tinued  to  pay  their  taxes ;  and  the  upper 
house,  which  was  completely  under  the 
control  of  the  government,  voted  the 
desired  appropriations.  The  money  was 
then  spent  by  the  government  without 
authorization  from  the  Deputies,  and  the 
army  was  reorganized  according  to  the 
plans  of  the  king  and  his  minister  of 
war. 

Prussia’s  foreign  policy  during  these 
years,  on  the  other  hand,  seems  very 
intricate  and  somewhat  tortuous;  and  as 
far  as  the  details  are  concerned  it  was 
necessarily  so.  Bismarck  had  assumed 
the  direction  of  Prussia’s  affairs  with  the 
intention  of  solving  the  German  question 
by  establishing  the  hegemony  of  Prussia. 
This  could  be  done  only  after  a  sue- 


BISMARCK 


23 


cessful  war  with  Austria.  To  assure 
Prussia’s  triumph,  Austria  must  remain 
isolated,  and  to  that  end  Prussia  must 
maintain  cordial  relations  with  France 
and  Russia.  So  far,  all  was  clear  and 
simple ;  but  the  method  by  which  these 
ends  were  to  be  attained  could  not  be 
determined  in  advance :  it  depended  ne¬ 
cessarily  upon  the  course  of  events.  Bis¬ 
marck  had  devoted  his  three  years  in  St. 
Petersburg  to  cementing  the  friendly  re¬ 
lations  already  existing  between  Russia 
and  Prussia  and  had  obtained  assurance 
that  Russia  would  not  interfere  again,  as 
in  1850,  in  behalf  of  Austria.^}  During 
his  brief  mission  in  France  he  seems  to 
have  convinced  himself  that  Napoleon 
III  would  also  remain  neutral.  As  presi¬ 
dent  of  the  ministry,  one  of  his  earliest 
acts  was  to  conclude  a  liberal  commercial 
treaty  with  France ;  and  the  insurrection 
of  1863  in  Russian  Poland  enabled  him 
to  render  useful  aid  to  the  Russian  gov¬ 
ernment.  The  re-opening  of  the  Schles¬ 
wig-Holstein  question,  in  the  same  year, 


Austria 


Russia 


France 


24 


BISMARCK 


Schleswig- 

Holstein 

question 


touched  Germany  more  nearly ;  and  this 
question,  as  Bismarck  handled  it,  led 
directly  to  the  solution  of  the  German 
problem. 

The  Schleswig-Holstein  question,  al¬ 
though  a  complicated  one,  is  not  so  unin¬ 
telligible  as  is  commonly  supposed.  These 
two  German  duchies  had  long  been  united 
with  Denmark ;  but  they  were  not  parts 
of  Denmark,  for  the  union  was  purely 
personal :  it  resulted  from  the  fact  that 
their  dukes  had  become  kings  of  Den¬ 
mark.  The  Danes  naturally  desired  to 
make  the  union  a  real  one.  In  the  way 
of  their  ambition  stood  the  facts  that 
Holstein  belonged  to  the  German  con¬ 
federation  and  that  old  treaties  guaran¬ 
teed  that  Schleswig  and  Holstein  should 
never  be  separated.  Hence  the  incorpora¬ 
tion  of  Schleswig  was  impossible  without 
the  simultaneous  incorporation  of  Hol¬ 
stein,  and  the  incorporation  of  Holstein  was 
impossible  without  the  assent  of  Germany 
—  an  assent  which  the  Danes  could  not 


BISMARCK 


25 


hope  to  obtain.  This  complicated  state  of 
things  had  already  caused  much  trouble.  In 
the  revolutionary  year  of  1848  the  Schles- 
wig-Holsteiners  had  risen  against  the 
Danes  and  attempted  to  establish  their 
independence,  and  Germany  had  actively 
supported  the  movement.  But  when  the 
German  revolution  was  suppressed,  the 
Schleswig-Holstein  revolution  shared  its 
fate.  The  revolt  of  the  duchies  was  re¬ 
garded  by  the  Conservatives  generally, 
and  by  the  governments  of  Austria  and 
Prussia  in  particular,  simply  as  an  insur¬ 
rection  against  constituted  princely  au¬ 
thority  ;  and  both  Prussia  and  Austria 
aided  in  the  restoration  of  the  duchies  to 
their  lawful  sovereign.  The  whole  question 
of  their  relation  to  Denmark,  present  and 
future,  was  discussed  in  London  in  1852, 
and  an  attempt  was  made  to  settle  it  by 
a  European  treaty.  It  was  then  already 
foreseen  that  the  union  with  Denmark, 
established  by  a  dynastic  accident,  was 
likely  to  be  severed  in  the  same  way. 
The  main  line  of  the  ruling  dynasty  was 


Revolt  of 
the  duchies 
1848 


London 

conference 

1852 


26 


BISMARCK 


London 

protocol 

1852 


dying  out ;  and  the  succession  to  the 
Danish  throne  was  certain  to  pass,  sooner 
or  later,  to  the  Glucksburg  branch  of 
the  family.  But  this  branch  derived  title 
through  the  female  line,  and  the  suc¬ 
cession  in  Schleswig-Holstein  was  gov¬ 
erned  by  the  Salic  law.  Schleswig- 
Holstein  accordingly  would  pass,  not  to 
the  Glucksburg,  but  to  the  younger  Au- 
gustenbursr  line.  The  London  conference 
undertook  to  change  all  this.  It  decreed 
that  Schleswig-Holstein  should  be  per¬ 
manently  associated  with  Denmark,  and 
that  the  succession,  both  in  Denmark 
and  in  the  duchies,  should  be  vested  in 
the  Glucksburg  heirs.  This  treaty  or 
protocol  of  May  8,  1852,  was  signed 
by  Prussia  and  Austria  as  European 
powers;  but  it  was  not  ratified  by  the 
German  confederation  nor  in  any  way 
accepted  by  the  Schleswig-Holsteiners. 
And  the  Prussian  and  Austrian  ambas¬ 
sadors  signed  the  London  protocol  only 
after,  and  in  consideration  of,  a  previous 
treaty  with  Denmark,  by  which  that 


BISMARCK 


2  7 


kingdom  bound  itself  to  respect  the 
autonomy  of  the  Schleswig-Holsteiners 
and  not  to  incorporate  Schleswig. 

Such  was  the  position  of  affairs  when 
King  Frederick  VII  of  Denmark  issued 
a  decree  (the  patent  of  March  30,  1863) 
which  separated  Schleswig  from  Holstein 
and  practically  incorporated  the  former  in 
the  kingdom  of  Denmark.  The  German 
powers  at  once  protested ;  and  the 
Federal  Diet,  in  October,  ordered  an 
“  execution  ”  in  Holstein,  i.  e.  voted  to 
send  troops  there.  On  November  14  a 
new  Danish  parliament,  representing 
Denmark  and  Schleswig,  voted  a  new 
constitution  incorporating  Schleswig. 
On  the  following  day  Frederick  VII 
died.  His  successor,  Christian  IX,  signed 
the  new  constitution.  Frederick’s  death 
complicated  the  question  of  the  special 
rights  of  Schleswig  with  the  broader  ques¬ 
tion  of  the  succession  in  both  duchies. 
By  the  London  protocol  Christian  IX 
became  duke  of  Schleswig-Holstein  as 
well  as  king  of  Denmark.  But  the 


Danish 

aggression 

1863 


Death  of  the 
Danish  king 


Dispute 
over  the 
succession 


28 


BISMARCK 


Prussia's 
choice  of 
courses  in 
1863 


The  popular 
course 


German  confederation,  as  we  have  seen, 
had  never  agreed  to  this,  nor  had  the 
Schleswig-Holsteiners.  In  their  opinion 
Christian  of  Gllicksburg  had  no  rights  in 
the  duchies ;  and  when,  in  December, 
the  federal  execution  was  carried  into 
effect  by  an  army  of  12,000  Saxons  and 
Hanoverians,  Frederick  of  Augustenburg 
was  acclaimed  as  duke,  and  took  up  his 
residence  at  Kiel. 

To  the  Prussian  government  two  courses 
were  open.  It  could  recognize  the  Lon¬ 
don  protocol  as  still  in  force  and  compel 
Christian  IX,  as  duke  of  Schleswig-Hol¬ 
stein,  to  observe  the  preliminary  treaty 
which  guaranteed  Schleswig’s  autonomy; 
or  it  could  declare  the  London  protocol 
abrogated,  recognize  Frederick  of  Augus¬ 
tenburg  as  duke  and  help  him  to  gain 
possession  of  Schleswig.  The  public  sen¬ 
timent  of  Prussia,  as  of  the  other  German 
states,  was  strongly  in  favor  of  the  latter 
course.  By  adopting  it  Bismarck  would 
at  once  have  become  the  popular  leader 


BISMARCK 


29 


of  a  national  movement,  but  he  would 
have  imperilled  the  real  interests  not  only 
of  Prussia  but  also  of  Germany.  The 
revolutionary  character  of  the  popular 
programme  and  the  violation  of  treaties 
which  it  required  would  have  aroused  the 
opposition  of  Europe.  Prussia  and  the 
German  patriots  would  have  stood  alone 
together,  as  in  1850;  and,  if  successful 
against  such  odds,  they  would  simply 
have  added  a  new  petty  sovereignty  to  a 
Germany  cursed  already  with  over-many 
sovereignties.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
Prussian  government  should  accept  the 
situation  created  by  the  treaties  of  1852, 
it  could  indeed  demand  that  Schleswig 
be  not  incorporated  in  Denmark,  but 
if  this  point  should  be  conceded,  Prussia 
would  be  obliged  to  restore  both  duchies 
to  their  Danish  ruler.  This  was  what 
Austria  desired  and  the  German  patriots 
dreaded.  Bismarck,  however,  had  satisfied 
himself  that  the  party  in  power  at  Copen¬ 
hagen  would  accept  war  rather  than  give 
up  the  incorporation  of  Schleswig ;  and 


The 

unpopular 

course 


30 


BISMARCK 


Bismarck's 

decision 


war  once  declared,  he  foresaw  that  the 
prize  of  victory  would  be  whatever  the 
victor  chose  to  make  it.  The  Prussian 
cabinet  accordingly  announced  that  it 
recognized  the  treaties  of  1852  as  bind¬ 
ing,  and  that  it  demanded  from  Denmark 
nothing  but  the  observance  of  those  trea¬ 
ties  —  a  declaration  in  which  Austria 
gladly  joined.  The  storm  of  protest 
which  this  action  aroused  in  the  Prussian 
Diet  and  throughout  Germany  was  used 
by  Bismarck  to  secure  Austria’s  support 
in  decisive  measures  against  Denmark, 
and  to  avert  the  intervention  of  the  other 
European  powers.  “  If  you  do  not  sup¬ 
port  the  moderate  measures  which  we 
deem  necessary,”  Bismarck  said  to  Aus¬ 
tria, —  “If  you  oppose  the  just  and  tem¬ 
perate  course  which  we  are  pursuing,”  he 
declared  to  the  other  powers,  —  “  my  col¬ 
leagues  and  I  will  retire  from  the  ministry. 
The  king  will  then  be  forced  to  summon 
into  power  the  leaders  of  the  German 
revolutionary  party.”  For  fear  of  worse 
things  Austria  went  hand  in  hand  with 


BISMARCK 


31 


Prussia,  and  Europe  looked  on  inactive. 
The  Danes,  as  Bismarck  expected,  re¬ 
fused  to  abrogate  their  new  constitution, 
and  war  was  declared.  In  February,  1864, 
an  army  of  60,000  Austrians  and  Prus¬ 
sians  invaded  Schleswig,  and  on  April  18 
the  Prussians  stormed  the  redoubts  of 
Diippel.  A  week  later  representatives 
of  the  European  powers  met  in  London, 
agreed  upon  an  armistice  and  endeavored 
to  negotiate  a  treaty  of  peace.  The  nego¬ 
tiations  were  fruitless.  The  Danes  still 
refused  to  reestablish  the  personal  union 
and  demanded  the  annexation  of  a  por¬ 
tion  at  least  of  Schleswig.  The  war  was 
renewed,  the  allies  were  victorious,  and  by 
the  treaty  of  Vienna,  October  30,  1864, 
Denmark  ceded  Schleswig-Holstein  and 
the  little  duchy  of  Lauenburg  to  Prussia 
and  Austria. 

This  condominium  or  joint  sovereignty 
of  Prussia  and  Austria  in  the  duchies 
was  precisely  what  Bismarck  desired. 
Believing  that  war  with  Austria  was 


War  with 
Denmark 
1864 


Condominium 
in  Schleswig- 
Holstein 
1864-66 


32 


BISMARCK 


How  Aus¬ 
tria’s  play 
was  forced 


necessary  for  the  solution  of  the  German 
question,  it  seemed  to  him  convenient 
to  have  a  cause  of  war  always  ready ; 
and  such  a  relation  as  that  now  estab¬ 
lished  in  the  duchies  would  necessarily  be 
fruitful  of  causes  for  war.  Further,  when¬ 
ever  the  war  should  come,  these  duchies 
would  be  for  Prussia  an  extremely  desir¬ 
able  addition  to  the  stake  in  play.  They 
represented  a  possible  gain  for  Prussia,  but 
no  possible  gain  for  Austria.  Their  posi¬ 
tion  would  make  their  annexation  to 
Prussia  both  feasible  and  natural,  while 
Austria  could  in  no  case  dream  of  annexing 
them.  From  this  point  of  view,  Bismarck’s 
diplomacy  was  especially  skilful,  and  the 
association  of  Austria  in  the  enterprise 
was  its  most  masterly  feature.  Bismarck 
himself  declared,  after  the  French  war, 
that  the  Schleswig-Holstein  campaign 
was  the  one  of  which,  from  a  political 
point  of  view,  he  was  proudest. 

It  has  often  been  asked,  in  the  light 
of  subsequent  events,  why  Austria  joined 
forces  with  Prussia.  It  is  difficult  to  see 


BISMARCK 


33 


how  Austria  could  have  acted  otherwise. 
If  Bismarck  had  repudiated  the  London 
treaties,  then  indeed  Austria’s  course 
would  have  been  clear.  It  could  have 
put  itself  at  the  head  of  a  European 
concert  for  the  restraint  and  punishment 
of  the  Prussian  law-breakers.  Bismarck, 
however,  assumed  an  attitude  of  unimpeach¬ 
able  legality,  which  was  also  in  consonance 
with  the  Austro-Prussian  policy  of  1850; 
and  Austria  was  compelled  either  to  act 
with  Prussia  or  not  to  act  at  all.  Aus¬ 
trian  neutrality,  however,  would  have 
left  Prussia  in  complete  control  of  the 
field.  Prussia  would  have  made  war 
alone ;  would  have  annexed  the  duchies 
at  its  close ;  would  have  gained  greatly 
in  power  and  enormously  in  prestige. 
This  Austria  could  not  tolerate ;  and 
unless  it  were  prepared,  as  Bismarck  had 
already  suggested,  to  “  transfer  its  centre 
of  gravity  to  Ofen,”  it  had  to  go  with 
Prussia  in  order  to  see  that  Prussia  did 
not  go  too  far.  It  cannot  be  maintained 
that  Austria  was  duped ;  for  when,  at 


34 


BISMARCK 


Strained 
relations  with 
Austria 


Convention 
of  Gastein 
1865 


an  early  stage  of  the  joint  action,  the 
Austrian  cabinet  attempted  to  stipulate 
that  the  duchies  should  be  restored  to 
Denmark  unless  both  powers  agreed  upon 
some  other  disposition,  Bismarck  refused 
his  assent  and  substituted  a  stipulation, 
which  the  Austrian  ministry  accepted,  that 
the  eventual  disposition  of  the  duchies 
should  be  determined  by  agreement  be¬ 
tween  the  two  contracting  powers. 

The  joint  ownership  of  the  duchies 
speedily  led,  as  Bismarck  had  anticipated, 
to  dissension.  Austria  was  willing  to 
turn  them  over  to  Prussia  in  return  for 
compensation  in  Silesia.  King  William, 
however,  refused  to  cede  any  portion  of 
Silesia.  Austria  then  espoused  the  cause 
of  the  Augustenburg  prince.  Prussia 
protested,  and  war  seemed  imminent  in 
1865.  It  was  postponed,  not  so  much 
by  Bismarck’s  will  as  by  the  king’s,  and  a 
temporary  adjustment  was  reached  in  the 
convention  of  Gastein.  By  this  treaty 
Prussia  bought  out  Austria’s  rights  in 


BISMARCK 


35 


Lauenburg,  and  the  administration  of 
government  in  the  two  other  duchies 
was  divided,  Prussia  assuming  control  of 
Schleswig  and  Austria  of  Holstein.  But 
the  truce  was  a  short  one.  Prussia  ac¬ 
cused  Austria  of  encouraging  the  Au- 
gustenburg  agitation,  and  when,  on  June 
i,  1866,  Austria  submitted  the  Schleswig- 
Holstein  question  to  the  Federal  Diet, 
Prussia  declared  the  treaty  of  Gastein 
broken  and  the  joint  administration  of 
the  duchies  reestablished.  Prussian  troops 
were  accordingly  sent  into  Holstein.  Aus¬ 
tria  pronounced  this  a  breach  of  the 
peace;  and  on  June  11  the  Austrian  rep¬ 
resentative  in  the  Federal  Diet  proposed 
the  mobilization  against  Prussia  of  the 
contingents  of  all  the  other  German 
states.  This  motion  was  carried,  June 
14,  by  a  three-fifths  vote.  The  Prussian 
representative  declared,  in  the  name  of 
his  government,  that  this  attempt  to  levy 
federal  war  upon  a  member  of  the  con¬ 
federation  was  a  breach  of  the  funda¬ 
mental  pact  of  union,  and  that  the  con- 


36 


BISMARCK 


The  German 
question 


The  war  with 
Austria,  1866 


federation  was  thereby  dissolved.  He 
added  that  it  was  the  purpose  of  his  gov¬ 
ernment  to  find  for  the  unity  of  the 
German  people  a  form  better  suited  to 
the  conditions  of  the  age. 

For  nearly  three  months,  in  accordance 
with  a  plan  foreshadowed  in  his  earlier 
letters,  Bismarck  had  been  pushing  the 
German  question  to  the  front.  He  had 
been  agitating,  by  circulars  to  all  the 
German  governments,  the  question  of 
federal  reform,  and  on  April  9  he  had 
caused  a  proposal  to  be  introduced  in  the 
Federal  Diet  for  the  establishment  of  a 
German  parliament  on  the  basis  of  man¬ 
hood  suffrage.  Immediately  after  the 
vote  of  June  14,  Prussia  called  upon  the 
governments  of  Saxony,  Hanover  and 
Hesse-Cassel  to  join  in  the  establishment 
of  a  new  federal  union.  Upon  their  re¬ 
fusal  Prussian  troops  invaded  these  terri¬ 
tories,  and  the  war  for  the  control  of 
Germany  began  on  June  16,  1866. 

Neither  Austria  nor'Trussia  stood  alone. 
Austria  was  supported  by  all  the  South 


BISMARCK 


37 


German  states,  viz.  Bavaria,  Wiirtemberg, 
Baden  and  Hesse-Darmstadt,  and  by  the 
more  important  states  of  North  Germany, 
viz.  Hanover,  Saxony,  Hesse-Cassel  and 
Nassau.  Prussia  had  secured  the  alliance 
of  Italy  by  a  secret  treaty  (April  8).  In 
case  of  victory  Italy  was  to  receive 
Venice.  The  war  was  practically  ter¬ 
minated  by  the  great  Prussian  victory  of 
Koniggratz  or  Sadowa,  July  3.  After 
Sadowa,  Prussia  was  in  a  position  to  dic¬ 
tate  the  terms  of  peace.  The  military 
men  wished  to  enter  Vienna  and  to  de¬ 
mand  a  strip  of  Bohemian  territory.  Bis¬ 
marck  feared  a  joint  intervention  of  the 
neutral  powers  and  desired  a  speedy  set¬ 
tlement.  He  also  urged  the  impolicy  of 
inflicting  lasting  wounds  upon  Austria’s 
national  pride ;  and  after  a  hard  struggle 
he  carried  his  point.  Preliminaries  of 
peace  were  signed  at  Nicolsburg,  July  26, 
and  the  final  treaty  at  Prague,  August  23. 
Italy  received  Venice;  Austria  conveyed 
to  Prussia  its  interests  in  Schleswig- 
Holstein  and  recognized  the  dissolution 

O 


Sadowa 


7T 


Peace  of 
Prague 


38 


BISMARCK 


Napoleon's 

interference 


Prussian  an¬ 
nexations 


of  the  old  German  confederation  and  the 
creation  of  a  new  North  German  confed-  a, 
eration,  to  be  composed  of  the  states 
north  of  the  Main.  North  of  the  Main, 
also,  Prussia  was  to  annex  such  territo¬ 
ries  as  it  saw  fit,  promising  to  spare 
Saxony.  The  South  German  states  were 
to  be  permitted  to  form  an  independent 
confederation  of  their  own.  Austria  was 
for  ever  excluded  from  Germany. 

To  these  arrangements  Napoleon  III 
was  in  fact  though  not  ostensibly  a  party. 

It  was  French  influence,  backed  by  the 
prospect  of  French  intervention,  that  se¬ 
cured  the  recognition  of  South  German 
independence.  In  consideration  of  the 
abandonment  —  or  rather  postponement — 
of  Prussian  hegemony  over  South  Ger¬ 
many,  Napoleon  assented  to  more  exten¬ 
sive  Prussian  annexations  in  North  Ger¬ 
many  than  were  at  first  proposed. 

Prussia  annexed  Schleswig-Holstein, 
Hanover,  Hesse-Cassel,  Nassau  and  the 
free  city  of  Frankfort,  adding  four  and  a 
half  millions  to  its  population  and  in- 


BISMARCK 


39 


creasing  its  territory  by  a  fourth.  The 
annexation  of  Hanover  was  especially  ad¬ 
vantageous  ;  it  rounded  out  what  Motley 
had  described  as  “  Prussia’s  wasp-waist.” 

All  the  rest  of  the  German  states  north 
of  the  Main,  including  the  kingdom  of 
Saxony,  ten  duchies,  seven  principalities, 
and  the  free  cities  of  Hamburg,  Llibeck 
and  Bremen,  joined  with  Prussia  in  the 
formation  of  a  new  federal  union  —  the 
North  German  confederation.  Its  con¬ 
stitution  was  draughted  by  Bismarck,  ac¬ 
cepted  by  the  governments  of  the  single 
states,  and  submitted  in  1867  to  an  Im¬ 
perial  Diet  chosen  by  manhood  suffrage. 
After  this  Diet  had  passed  it  with  a 
number  of  amendments,  it  was  ratified 
without  further  amendment  by  the  leg¬ 
islatures  of  the  single  states.  Under  its 
provisions  the  executive  powers  of  the 
union  were  vested  in  a  president  (the 
king  of  Prussia)  and  a  Federal  Coun¬ 
cil  consisting  of  appointed  representatives 
of  the  different  states.  In  this  council 
Prussia  was  to  have  seventeen  votes,  Saxony 


The  North 
German  con¬ 
federation 


40 


BISMARCK 


Character 
of  the  new 
union. 


four,  the  larger  duchies  and  principalities 
each  three  or  two,  and  the  smaller  princi¬ 
palities  and  the  free  cities  each  one.  The 
presidency  of  the  council  was  entrusted 
to  a  chancellor,  appointed  by  the  federal 
president.  (Bismarck,  of  course,  became 
chancellor.)  The  legislative  power  was 
vested  in  the  Federal  Council  and  an 
Imperial  Diet  elected  by  manhood  suf¬ 
frage.  In  name  federal,  the  new  union 
was  essentially  national.  Its  power  ex¬ 
tended  over  military  and  naval  matters ; 
over  commerce,  railways,  telegraphs  and 
the  post;  over  the  entire  field  of  judicial 
organization,  criminal  law  and  procedure, 
civil  procedure  and  commercial  law.  The 
change  from  the  old  confederation  (1815- 
1866)  to  this  new  union  was  greater  than 
the  change  from  the  American  articles 
of  confederation  to  the  American  consti¬ 
tution  of  1789. 

In  the  light  of  these  splendid  achieve¬ 
ments,  the  public  judgment  of  Bismarck 
underwent  an  immediate  and  complete 


BISMARCK 


41 


reversal.  A  few  of  his  opponents  had  Bismarck’s 
been  converted  to  his  support  by  the  out-  ^1862-66^ 


come  of  the  Danish  campaign,  but  until 
the  autumn  of  1866  he  was  generally 
regarded  as  a  reactionary,  pure  and  simple. 

His  conflict  with  the  Prussian  Chamber 
of  Deputies  had  naturally  intensified  this 
impression.  In  his  support  of  the  army 
reform,  in  his  hostility  to  the  insurgent 
Poles,  in  his  treatment  of  the  Schleswig- 
Holstein  question,  he  had  defiantly  an¬ 
tagonized  German  public  opinion ;  and 
when  it  became  evident  that  his  conduct 
of  Prussian  policy  was  certain  to  produce 
war  with  Austria,  he  was  the  best  hated 
and  the  best  denounced  man  in  Germany. 

On  May  7,  iSStf,  he  narrowly  escaped  Attempt  on 
death  at  the  hands  of  a  fanatic  named 
Cohen.  The  assassin  killed  himself  in 
prison.  Crowds  of  people  visited  the 
cell,  and  women  covered  Cohen’s  body 
with  flowers  and  crowns  of  laurel. 

The  revulsion  of  feeling  which  followed  Reversal  of 
the  Austrian  war,  and  the  sudden  popu-  sentiment 
larity  of  its  author,  were  not  due  solely, 


42 


BISMARCK 


Bill  of  in¬ 
demnity 


Shifting  of 
party  lines 


nor  even  chiefly,  to  the  vulgar  admiration 
of  success.  Bismarck  had  realized  the 
deepest  desire  of  the  German  people.  He 
had  made  Germany  a  nation,  with  a  legis¬ 
lature  resting  on  the  broadest  and  most 
popular  basis.  He  also  made  peace  with 
the  Prussian  Chamber  of  Deputies.  To 
the  dismay  of  his  Tory  supporters,  and 
not  without  a  struggle  with  his  royal  mas¬ 
ter,  he  asked  and  received  indemnity  for 
governing  without  a  budget,  thus  recog¬ 
nizing  the  rights  of  the  Chamber  and  the 
abnormal  character  of  his  own  adminis¬ 
tration  during  the  period  of  conflict.  The 
natural  result  was  a  complete  disorganiza¬ 
tion  of  the  parliamentary  opposition  and 
a  general  shifting  of  party  lines.  The 
best  elements  of  the  opposition,  the  Old 
Liberals  of  1848,  formed  a  new  National 
Liberal  group,  which  during  the  next  ten 
years  generally  acted  in  concert  with  the 
government  and,  with  the  Conservatives, 
gave  it  a  working  majority  both  in  the 
Prussian  Diet  and  in  the  Imperial  Par¬ 
liament. 


BISMARCK 


43 


This  simplified  the  internal  politics  of 
Prussia  and  of  the  confederation ;  but  the 
foreign  relations  of  the  new  union  were 
far  from  satisfactory.  Napoleon,  as  we 
have  seen,  had  thus  far  shown  himself 
friendly  to  Prussia.  He  had  intimated,  in 

1865,  his  willingness  to  conclude  an  offen¬ 
sive  alliance  against  Austria  (Prussia  to 
reorganize  Germany  and  France  to 
receive  payment  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine);  and  in  spite  of  the  rejection  of 
this  offer  he  had  actively  furthered  the 
conclusion  of  the  alliance  between  Prussia 
and  Italy.  He  did  not  believe  that  Prus¬ 
sia  was  a  match  for  Austria ;  he  believed 
that  his  aid  would  still  be  needed,  and 
that  he  would  ultimately  get  his  price. 
Sadowa  defeated  these  schemes ;  and  after 
Sadowa  he  should  have  seen  that  nothing 
was  to  be  gained  by  negotiation.  He 
could  not  or  would  not  see  this,  and  at 
once  began  to  demand  compensation  for 
his  neutrality.  At  Nicolsburg,  in  July, 

1866,  his  ambassador,  M.  Benedetti, 
demanded  a  rectification  of  France’s  east- 


Strained 
relations  with 
France 


Compen¬ 

sations 

demanded 


44 


BISMARCK 


ern  frontier.  On  August  5  the  French 
demands  were  put  into  definite  form. 
Prussia  was  to  grant  France  the  frontier 
of  1814,  and  was  to  obtain  from  Bavaria 
and  from  Hesse-Darmstadt  the  cession  of 
their  provinces  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine.  Luxemburg  was  to  be  separated 
from  Germany  and  the  Prussian  garrison 
was  to  be  withdrawn  from  the  fortress.1 
Bismarck  promptly  declared  that  the  ces¬ 
sion  of  German  territory  could  not  be 
considered.  On  August  20  Benedetti  de¬ 
clared  that  France  would  be  satisfied  with 
Saarlouis,  Landau  and  Luxemburg;  but 
if  Prussia  would  help  France  to  acquire 

1  Luxemburg  belonged,  at  this  time,  to  the  king  of 
the  Netherlands.  It  had  formed  part  of  the  old  German 
confederation.  The  fortress  of  Luxemburg  was  a  federal 
fortress,  and  the  Prussian  garrison  was  stationed  there 
in  accordance  with  federal  treaty.  With  the  dissolution 
of  the  old  confederation,  Luxemburg  was  already  practi¬ 
cally  separated  from  Germany,  and  the  reason  for  keep¬ 
ing  a  Prussian  garrison  in  the  fortress  had  disappeared. 
Napoleon  desired  that  Prussia  should  recognize  these 
facts  and  inferences,  in  order  that  the  way  might  be 
clear  for  his  acquiring  Luxemburg  from  the  king  of  the 
Netherlands. 


BISMARCK 


45 


Belgium,  France  would  permit  Prussia 
to  incorporate  South  Germany  in  the 
German  confederation.  On  August  29, 
Benedetti  put  this  latter  suggestion  into 
the  form  of  a  draught  treaty  in  his  own 
handwriting.  It  has  never  been  shown 
that  Bismarck  agreed  to  any  of  these 
demands ;  but  he  undoubtedly  permitted 
the  French  ambassador  to  hope  that  some 
compensation  would  be  conceded.  “  Au 
moins,”  as  Sorel  neatly  says,  “il  y  avait  eu 
dialogue”;  and  it  is  inconceivable  that 
Benedetti  should  have  gone  so  far  without 
considerable  encouragement.  Bismarck 
has  himself  admitted  that  he  pursued  a 
“  dilatory  ”  policy.  His  object  was  twofold. 
He  desired  to  postpone  the  inevitable  war 
with  France  until  the  Prussian  military 
system  was  introduced  in  the  annexed 
provinces  and  in  the  other  German  states ; 
and  he  desired  documentary  evidence  of 
the  French  demands.  This,  as  we  have 
seen,  he  obtained ;  and  of  the  documents 
thus  obtained  he  made  very  effective  use. 
During  the  peace  negotiations  between 


Evidence  of 
French 
demands 
secured 


\ 


V 


Use  made  of 
the  evidence 


46 


BISMARCK 


Prussia  and  Bavaria  in  August,  1866, 
Bavaria  appealed  to  Napoleon  for  his 
good  offices,  which  Napoleon  promptly 
granted.  Bismarck  met  this  move  by 
exhibiting  to  the  Bavarian  minister  the 
draught  treaty  of  August  5,  showing  him 
that  his  friend  the  emperor  of  the  French 
had  asked  Prussia  for  large  portions  of 
Bavarian  and  Hessian  territory.  The 
result  of  this  revelation  was  the  imme¬ 
diate  conclusion,  not  merely  of  a  treaty  of 
peace,  but  also  of  a  secret  treaty  of  offen¬ 
sive  and  defensive  alliance  between  Prus¬ 
sia  and  Bavaria  (August  22).  Similar 
treaties  had  already  been  concluded  with 
Wiirtemberg  and  Baden.  Equally  effec¬ 
tive  use  was  made  of  the  draught  treaty 
concerning  Belgium.  It  was  published  in 
the  London  Times  of  July  25,  1870,  a 
few  days  after  the  French  declaration  of 
war.  The  effect  of  this  disclosure  upon 
the  public  opinion  of  England  and  of 
Europe  was  all  that  Bismarck  could 
desire. 


BISMARCK 


47 


The  prime  cause  of  the  Franco-German 
war  was  the  irritation  felt  by  the  French 
people  at  the  growth  of  a  first-class  power 
on  their  eastern  frontier.  A  long  step 
had  been  taken  in  1S66  towards  German 
unity,  and  the  completion  of  this  move¬ 
ment,  it  was  felt,  would  threaten  the  tra¬ 
ditional  primacy  of  France  in  Europe.  A 
secondary  cause  was  the  failure  of  the 
French  government  to  obtain  territorial 
compensation  for  the  increased  power 
of  Prussia.  After  the  unsuccessful  nego¬ 
tiations  described  above,  Napoleon  at¬ 
tempted  in  1867  to  carry  out  a  part  at 
least  of  his  programme  by  purchasing 
Luxemburg  from  the  king  of  the  Nether¬ 
lands.  This  attempt  created  great  indig¬ 
nation  among  the  people  of  Germany ; 
and  the  military  party  at  Berlin,  believing 
that  a  contest  with  France  was  inevitable, 
wished  to  precipitate  the  war  before  the 
French  army  reforms,  then  under  dis¬ 
cussion,  were  completed.  Bismarck,  how¬ 
ever,  declared  that  “  the  personal  convic¬ 
tion  of  a  ruler  or  statesman,  however  well 


Genesis 
of  the 

Franco-Ger¬ 
man  war 


Luxemburg 

incident 

1867 


48 


BISMARCK 


Coalition 

against 

Germany 


founded,  that  war  will  eventually  break 
out,  cannot  justify  its  promotion.”  He 
contrived  to  defeat  the  purchase  of  Lux¬ 
emburg  without  giving  the  French  gov¬ 
ernment  any  tangible  grievance  against 
Prussia.  But  Napoleon  felt  that  he  had 
again  been  duped,  and  the  incident 
increased  the  tension  between  the  two 
nations.  A  large  body  of  Napoleon’s 
warmest  supporters  began  to  agitate  for 
war  against  Prussia  as  the  only  means  of 
rehabilitating  the  prestige  of  the  dynasty. 
Negotiations  were  opened  by  Napoleon 
with  the  emperor  of  Austria  and  the 
king  of  Italy  for  joint  action  against 
Prussia;  and  although,  because  of  the 
failure  of  the  three  courts  to  reach  any 
satisfactory  agreement  on  the  Roman 
question,  no  formal  treaty  was  signed,  an 
understanding  was  attained  early  in  June, 
1870,  that  if  France  declared  war  upon 
Prussia  and  succeeded  in  occupying  South 
Germany,  then  Austria  and  Italy,  having 
gained  time  for  mobilization  by  a  tempo¬ 
rary  neutrality,  would  also  declare  war 


BISMARCK 


49 


and  add  their  forces  to  those  of  France. 

War,  it  appears,  was  not  contemplated 
before  1871,  for  the  Austrian  military 
authorities  stipulated  that  the  declaration 
of  war  by  France  should  be  made  not 
later  than  in  April. 

The  immediate  occasion  of  the  war  was  The  Spanish 
the  Spanish  candidacy  of  Prince  Leopold  candldacy 
of  Hohenzollern.  This  prince,  although  a 
Hohenzollern,  was  not  a  member  of  the 
Prussian  royal  house  but  of  the  South 
German  and  Catholic  house  of  Hohenzol- 
lern-Sigmaringen.  He  was  more  closely 
connected  with  the  imperial  family  of 
France  than  with  the  royal  family  of 
Prussia.  By  family  compact,  however, 
the  king  of  Prussia  was  recognized 
as  the  head  of  the  house.  The  Span¬ 
ish  ministry,  in  search  of  a  Catholic 
king,  had  repeatedly  offered  to  present 
Leopold’s  name  to  the  Cortes  —  twice  in 
1869  and  again  in  March,  1870  —  but  the 
offer  had  been  declined.  King  William 
advised  against  the  acceptance  of  the 
candidacy,  and  in  1869  Bismarck  was  of 


50 


BISMARCK 


Bismarck’s 
part  in  the 
affair 


the  same  mind.  In  1870,  however,  Bis¬ 
marck  advised  acceptance.  His  change 
of  opinion,  he  said,  was  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  Spanish  revolutionary  govern¬ 
ment,  unstable  in  1869,  had  obtained  in 
1870  the  complete  control  of  the  coun¬ 
try.  When  the  third  offer  had  been  de¬ 
clined,  Bismarck  secured,  through  Prus¬ 
sian  agents,  a  fourth  offer;  and  in  June, 
1870,  largely  in  consequence  of  his  ad¬ 
vice,  Leopold  consented  to  become  a  can¬ 
didate.  King  William  was  informed  of 
the  prince’s  decision  and  declared  that  he 
could  interpose  no  objection.  Although 
these  negotiations  were  conducted  quietly, 
they  were  not  kept  secret  from  Napo¬ 
leon.  In  the  interest  of  his  dynasty,  the 
emperor  would  probably  have  preferred 
Leopold  to  the  Orleanist  duke  de  Mont- 
pensier,  who  was,  in  1870,  the  only  other 
prominent  candidate ;  but  he  had  in¬ 
formed  Benedetti,  and  Benedetti  had 
probably  informed  Bismarck,  that  the 
French  people  would  not  tolerate  a 
Hohenzollern  candidacy.  German  writ- 


BISMARCK 


51 


ers  assert,  however,  that  Bismarck  did 
not  expect  serious  opposition  from  Napo¬ 
leon  ;  and,  as  a  further  proof  of  his  pacific 
intentions,  they  point  out  that  he  had 
kept  open  a  line  of  retreat.  This  latter 
assertion  is  true.  Bismarck  had  caused 
the  question  to  be  dealt  with  from  the 
outset  as  one  that  in  no  wise  concerned 
the  Prussian  state,  and  that  concerned 
the  king  only  as  titular  head  of  the 
Sigmaringen  branch  of  the  family.  From 
this  point  of  view,  Leopold’s  acceptance 
concerned  only  himself  and  Spain ;  and 
the  same  would  be  true  of  his  withdrawal. 
It  would  in  no  wise  compromise  the  dig¬ 
nity  or  lessen  the  prestige  of  Prussia. 
The  other  assertion,  however,  that  Bis¬ 
marck  expected  no  serious  opposition  on 
Napoleon’s  part,  is  far  from  plausible. 
The  facts  seem  to  be  that  Bismarck  pro¬ 
moted  the  candidacy  with  the  expectation 
that  opposition  would  be  encountered,  and 
planned  at  the  same  time  that  his  candi¬ 
date  should  withdraw  when  the  opposition 
had  become  manifest.  1  <■  \  \ 


52 


BISMARCK 


Bismarck's 

motives 


What  were  his  motives  ?  In  the  pres¬ 
ent  state  of  our  information,  only  a  con- 
jecturaljajiswer  is  possible.  If  we  assume 
that  Bismarck  was  aware  of  the  arrange¬ 
ments  that  were  making  for  an  attack 
on  Germany  in  1871,  we  can  see  why  he 
should  desire  to  provoke  a  declaration 
of  war  in  1870  before  those  arrangements 
were  perfected.  He  would  naturally 
desire,  further,  that  France  should  de¬ 
clare  war  under  such  circumstances  that 
European  public  opinion  would  condemn 
its  action.  Prince  Leopold’s  candidacy 
would  not  give  France  a  very  good  casus 
belli ;  and  if  by  any  chance  France 
should  declare  war  after  Prince  Leopold’s 
withdrawal,  the  situation,  from  the  Ger¬ 
man  point  of  view,  would  be  ideal.  It 
is  perhaps  improbable  that  Bismarck’s 
calculations  had  been  pushed  to  this 
point  in  the  spring  of  1870;  but  he  must 
have  foreseen  that  Prince  Leopold’s  ac¬ 
ceptance  and  withdrawal  would  place 
Napoleon  and  his  ministers  in  a  diffi¬ 
cult  position  —  a  position  in  which  it 


BISMARCK 


53 


would  be  easy  to  blunder;  and  we  know 
that  he  had  little  respect  for  Napoleon’s 
capacity  and  still  less  for  that  of  de  Gra- 
mont,  the  new  French  minister  of  for¬ 
eign  affairs.  He  had  long  since  described 
Napoleon  as  une  grande  incapacity  me- 
cojmue,  and  he  had  declared  that  Gramont 
was  the  greatest  blockhead  ( Dummkopf ) 
in  Europe. 

When,  early  in  July,  the  news  of  the 
prince’s  acceptance  reached  Paris  by  way 
of  Madrid,  great  indignation  was  mani¬ 
fested  in  the  French  journals  and  by  the 
French  government.  Gramont  declared 
the  candidacy  an  attempt  “  to  reestablish 
the  empire  of  Charles  V.”  A  protest 
sent  to  Berlin  elicited  from  an  under¬ 
secretary  (Bismarck  was  in  Varzin)  the 
information  that  Prussia  had  nothing  to 
do  with  the  candidacy.  Benedetti  was 
then  instructed  to  proceed  to  Ems,  where 
King  William  was  taking  the  waters,  and 
to  ask  the  king  to  obtain  from  Prince 
Leopold  a  withdrawal  of  his  acceptance. 
The  king  answered  that  he  had  no  right 


Leopold’s 

acceptance 


French 

demand 


54 


BISMARCK 


William’s 

attitude 


Leopold’s 

withdrawal 


New  French 
demands 


to  address  such  a  demand  to  the  prince ; 
but  he  told  Benedetti  that  if  the  prince 
saw  fit  to  withdraw  he  would  approve  the 
withdrawal.  On  July  12  the  French 
government  received  notice,  again  from 
Madrid,  that  Prince  Leopold’s  acceptance 
had  been  withdrawn.  This  was  regarded 
throughout  Europe  as  the  end  of  the 
incident.  It  was  felt  that  the  French 
government  had  carried  its  point  and 
that  there  would  be  no  war.  Napoleon 
and  his  prime  minister,  Ollivier,  expressed 
themselves  in  this  sense.  Bismarck,  who 
had  reached  Berlin  and  had  intended  to 
proceed  at  once  to  Ems,  decided  to  stay 
in  Berlin.  But  Gramont,  supported  in 
this  by  the  general  feeling  of  Paris  and 
of  the  Deputies,  declared  that  the  satis¬ 
faction  obtained  by  France  was  inade¬ 
quate.  He  suggested  to  Werther,  the 
Prussian  ambassador,  that  King  William 
should  write  an  explanatory  letter  to  the 
emperor;  and,  with  Napoleon’s  assent,  he 
instructed  Benedetti  to  obtain  from  the 
king  an  assurance  that  the  candidacy 


BISMARCK 


55 


would  not  be  renewed.  On  the  morning 
of  July  13  the  king  was  asked  to  give 
such  a  pledge,  and  refused.  He  told 
Benedetti  that  this  demand  indicated  to 
him  a  determination  on  the  part  of  the 
French  government  to  force  a  war.  In 
the  French  cabinet,  on  the  evening  of 
the  13th,  it  was  not  felt  that  the  king’s 
refusal  made  war  necessary.  Energetic 
remonstrances  from  the  representatives  of 
friendly  powers  had  convinced  Napoleon 
and  his  ministers  that  they  had  gone  too 
far,  and  their  feeling  was  in  favor  of  ac¬ 
cepting  the  situation.  On  the  14th,  in 
consequence  of  action  taken  by  Bismarck 
the  day  before,  they  decided  upon  war; 
and  on  the  15  th  war  was  declared. 

On  the  morning  of  the  1 3th,  as  soon  as 
he  heard  of  the  new  French  demands  of 
the  12th,  Bismarck  for  the  first  time  took 
an  active  part  in  the  controversy.  He 
explained  to  the  English  ambassador  that 
France  was  obviously  determined  on  war, 
and  that  it  was  now  Prussia’s  turn  to  de¬ 
mand  explanations  and  assurances.  He 


France 
disposed  to 
retreat 


Bismarck 

intervenes 


"  Editing" 
the  Ems 
despatch 


Effect  of 
Bismarck's 
action 


56  BISMARCK 

notified  Werther  that  his  conduct  in  en¬ 
tertaining  the  demand  for  “  a  letter  of 
apology  ”  was  disapproved,  and  directed 
him  to  take  leave  of  absence  on  account 
of  ill  health.  On  the  evening  of  the  same 
day  he  received  a  telegraphic  account  of 
the  occurrences  of  the  morning  at  Ems, 
closing  with  the  suggestion,  on  the  part 
of  the  king,  that  the  new  French  demand 
and  its  refusal  be  made  public.  This 
suggestion  Bismarck  carried  out  in  the 
most  literal  fashion,  omitting  all  details. 
The  account  thus  given  to  the  public  cre¬ 
ated  the  impression  that  the  negotiations 
in  Ems  had  terminated  more  abruptly 
than  was  really  the  case.  The  Germans 
thought  that  King  William  had  been 
insulted, — which  was  true,  as  regarded  the 
substance  of  the  French  demand,  but  un¬ 
true  as  regarded  the  form  of  its  presen¬ 
tation, —  and  the  smouldering  indignation 
that  had  been  kindled  by  the  arrogant 
tone  of  the  French  orators  and  of  the 
French  press  burst  into  a  flame  of  wrath. 
The  Parisians  thought  that  their  ambas- 


BISMARCK 


57 


sador  had  been  insulted,  and  demanded  an 
immediate  declaration  of  war.  Napoleon 
and  his  ministers  knew  that  Benedetti’s 
dismissal  had  been  courteous;  but  they 
saw  that  peace  could  be  preserved  only 
by  an  obvious  and  unmistakable  retreat, 
on  their  part,  from  the  ill-considered 
position  which  they  had  taken  on  July  12. 
Bismarck  had  so  utilized  their  mistake 
as  to  hold  them  to  its  consequences. 

The  way  in  which  the  French  minis¬ 
ters  handled  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy 
shows  that  they  regarded  it,  at  the  out¬ 
set,  as  a  favorable  issue  on  which  to  force 
a  war.  If  France  should  declare  war  on  a 
distinctly  German  question,  all  Germany, 
they  foresaw,  would  side  with  Prussia,  and 
it  would  be  difficult  for  Austria  to  inter¬ 
vene.  By  selecting  a  question  which  con¬ 
cerned  only  the  Prussian  dynasty  they 
hoped  to  secure  the  neutrality  of  the 
South  German  states  and  the  active  as¬ 
sistance  of  Austria.  When,  after  being 
deprived  of  their  original  grievance,  they 


French 

expectations  - 


58 


BISMARCK 


Attitude  of 
South 
Germany 


nevertheless  declared  war,  they  undoubt¬ 
edly  hoped  that  the  French  troops  would 
secure,  without  serious  opposition,  the 
control  of  South  Germany  before  the 
North  German  mobilization  was  com¬ 
pleted,  and  that  Austria  and  Italy,  in 
spite  of  the  lateness  of  the  season,  would 
come  to  their  aid.  These  hopes  proved 
futile.  In  South  Germany,  as  in  the 
North,  the  war  was  regarded  as  an 
attack  on  German  independence,  and 
the  South  German  states  at  once  placed 
their  armies  at  the  disposal  of  the  king 
of  Prussia.  The  North  German  troops 
were  concentrated  on  the  Alsacian  fron¬ 
tier  with  unexpected  rapidity,  while  the 
French  mobilization  proved  far  slower 
than  was  anticipated.  From  the  start 
France  was  thrown  on  the  defensive. 
Partly  for  this  reason,  partly  because  held 
in  check  by  Russia,  Austria  remained 
neutral.  The  king  of  Italy,  in  spite  of 
the  dissent  of  his  ministers,  desired  to 
come  to  Napoleon’s  aid ;  but  the  suc¬ 
cess  of  the  Prussian  arms  was  too  rapid 


BISMARCK 


59 


and  complete  to  encourage  interference. 
Seven  weeks  after  the  declaration  of  war 
the  entire  force  with  which  Napoleon 
took  the  field  was  destroyed,  captured  or 
shut  up  in  besieged  fortresses.  After 
Sedan  the  issue  of  the  struggle  was  cer¬ 
tain  ;  but  the  heroic  obstinacy  of  the 
French  people  prolonged  the  war  for 
six  months.  Preliminaries  of  peace  were 
signed  at  Versailles,  February  26,  and 
the  final  treaty  at  Frankfort,  May  10, 
1871.  France  ceded  to  Germany  Alsace, 
including  Strasburg,  and  part  of  Lorraine, 
including  Metz,  —  about  1,500,000  souls, 
—  and  agreed  to  pay  a  war  indemnity  of 
5,000,000,000  francs. 

The  most  important  result  of  this  war 
was  the_completion  of  German  unity. 
In  South  Germany  local  patriotism  and 
religious  prejudice  had  heretofore  stood 
in  the  way  of  union  with  Prussia.  These 
obstacles  were  swept  away  in  the  enthu¬ 
siasm  of  this  national  war.  In  the  march 
from  the  Rhine  to  the  Seine,  Bavarians, 


German 

victories 


Peace  of 
Frankfort 


The  German 
empire 


6o 


BISMARCK 


Wurtembergers,  Hessians  and  Prussians 
felt  themselves,  as  never  before,  one  great 
people.  The  diplomatists  had  only  to 
put  the  stamp  of  law  upon  the  accom¬ 
plished  fact.  During  the  winter  treaties 
of  union  were  concluded  between  the 
North  German  confederation  and  the 
South  German  states;  and  on  January 
1 8,  in  the  hall  of  mirrors  in  Versailles, 
King  William  was  proclaimed  German 
emperor.  The  prophecy  of  Frederick 
William  IV  had  come  true  —  that  the 
imperial  crown  would  be  won  on  the  field 
of  battle. 

The  new  empire,  with  its  twenty-five 
states  and  its  one  territory  (Alsace-Lor¬ 
raine),  embraced,  at  its  establishment,  over 
40,000,000  people,  a  number  which  has 
since  risen,  by  the  natural  increase  of 
population  and  in  spite  of  emigration,  to 
more  than  53,000,000.  Its  constitution 
is  simply  a  revised  edition  of  the  North 
German  constitution  of  1867.  The  posi¬ 
tion  of  the  South  German  states,  barring 
a  few  reserved  rights,  is  identical  with 


BISMARCK 


6l 


that  of  the  North  German  states.  Their 
governments  are  represented  in  the  Fed¬ 
eral  Council  and  their  people  in  the 
Imperial  Diet. 

In  this  parliament  Bismarck  never  The  German 
found  —  nor  in  the  light  of  his  experi-  ^g^”' 
ence  with  the  Prussian  Diet  could  he 
have  hoped  to  create  —  a  passive  instru¬ 
ment  of  his  or  the  emperor’s  will.  The 
parliament  and  the  people  behind  it  have 
always  had  and  have  constantly  asserted 
an  independent  will  of  their  own.  But 
the  people  and  the  parliament  of  the 
new  empire  have  not  at  any  time  offered 
any  such  blind  and  obstinate  resistance 
to  the  realization  of  vital  national  inter¬ 
ests  as  did  the  Prussian  deputies  before 
1866.  The  internal  politics  of  the  em¬ 
pire  have  been  full  of  conflict ;  but  every 
conflict  has  been  fought  out  within  the 
lines  of  the  constitution,  and  settled  by 
some  compromise  which  has  preserved 
at  once  the  interests  of  the  state  and  the 
liberties  of  the  citizen. 


62 


BISMARCK 


The  Centrists 


i 


The  most  powerful  and  the  most  troub¬ 
lesome  element  of  opposition  was  the 
Ultramontane  or  Centre  party,  which  had 
sixty-three  votes  in  the  first  parliament  of 
the  empire  (1871-74),  and  since  1874  has 
regularly  numbered  about  one  hundred 
—  a  little  more  than  a  fourth  of  the  en¬ 
tire  membership.  It  was  ostensibly  estab¬ 
lished  to  defend  the  liberties  of  the 
Roman  Catholic  church  in  Germany; 
but  it  was  established  at  a  time  when 
no  measure  menacing  those  liberties  had 
been  passed  or  even  proposed.  It  really 
represented,  in  the  first  place,  the  hostil¬ 
ity  of  the  Roman  curia  to  the  establish¬ 
ment  in  central  Europe  of  a  powerful 
empire  with  a  Protestant  head;  and  it 
embodied,  in  the  second  place,  a  great 
deal  of  the  local  disaffection  due  to  the 
annexations  of  1866.  Its  leader,  Windt- 
horst,  was  formerly  a  minister  of  the 
king  of  Hanover;  and  the  malcontent 
Hanoverians  (Guelphs)  have  regularly 
acted  and  voted  as  its  allies.  The  out¬ 
spoken  disloyalty  of  some  of  its  mem- 


BISMARCK 


63 


bers  and  the  systematic  agitation  of  the 
Jesuits  and  of  a  portion  of  the  regular 
Catholic  clergy  induced  the  imperial  and 
state  governments,  first,  to  adopt  repres¬ 
sive  measures,  and  finally  to  attempt  by 
law  a  more  exact  definition  of  the  limits 
of  religious  liberty.  Thus  arose  the  so- 
called  “  culture  conflict.”  Bismarck  al¬ 
ways  objected  to  this  phrase,  insisting  on 
the  essentially  political  character  of  the 
struggle  and  declaring  that,  as  minister- 
president  and  chancellor,  he  was  not 
fighting  for  culture  but  for  the  politi¬ 
cal  interests  of  the  Prussian  state  and 
the  German  empire.  In  the  main  the 
conflict  was  fought  out  in  Prussia  and 
the  other  single  states,  religious  affairs 
not  falling  within  the  imperial  jurisdic¬ 
tion.  The  resistance  of  the  Catholic 
clergy  to  the  new  laws  —  particularly  to 
the  Prussian  “May  laws”  of  1873  —  was 
very  bitter  and  obstinate.  In  Prussia 
nearly  all  the  Catholic  bishops  were  im¬ 
prisoned  or  expelled ;  and  an  alarming 
number  of  parishes  were  deprived  of  all 


"Culture 
conflict  ’’ 


The  May 
laws,  1873 


64 


BISMARCK 


Close  of  the 
conflict,  1887 


spiritual  care.  The  Prussian  government 
soon  found  itself  obliged  to  ask  the  Diet 
for  large  powers  of  indulgence  and  dis¬ 
pensation  :  in  other  words,  for  power  to 
execute  the  laws  or  leave  them  unexe¬ 
cuted  at  its  discretion.  The  death  of 
Pius  IX,  January  7,  1878,  and  the  elec¬ 
tion  of  a  less  combative  and  more  politic 
successor,  Leo  XIII,  facilitated  the  at¬ 
tainment  of  a  modus  vivendi;  and  the 
disruption 

in  1879  and  the  resultant  disappearance 
of  the  governmental  majority  caused  Bis¬ 
marck  to  desire  a  truce.  He  needed 
Centrist  support;  and  he  secured  it  on 
the  do  ret  des  plan,  sacrificing  the  anti¬ 
clerical  legislation  bit  by  bit  in  return 
for  votes  for  governmental  measures.  A 
peace  —  or  rather  an  indefinite  truce  — 
was  concluded  with  the  Roman  curia  in 
1887.  Prussia  had  already  “revised”  the 
greater  portion  of  its  church  laws  out  of 
existence,  and  the  Pope  agreed  that  the 
government  should  be  notified  of  all 
intended  appointments  to  ecclesiastical 


of  the  National  Liberal  party 


BISMARCK 


65 


offices.  But,  notwithstanding  this  ar¬ 
rangement,  the  Centre  maintained  its 
organization  and  its  attitude  of  general 
opposition,  and  Bismarck  continued  to 
traffic  with  its  leaders  whenever  its  sup¬ 
port  was  necessary.  At  the  time  of  his 
dismissal  the  governmental  reserve  of  pos¬ 
sible  concessions  was  not  yet  exhausted ; 
there  was  still  enough  anti-clerical  legis¬ 
lation  on  the  statute-books  to  carry  his 
successor  through  one  rather  difficult  leg¬ 
islative  period. 

During  this  struggle  with  the  church, 
Bismarck  a  second  time  narrowly  es¬ 
caped  assassination.  On  July  13,  1874, 
while  driving  in  an  open  carriage,  he 
was  shot  at  by  a  cooper  named  Kull- 
mann.  At  the  moment  the  shot  was 
fired  Bismarck  had  touched  his  hat  in 
answer  to  the  salutation  of  an  acquaint¬ 
ance,  and  the  ball  passed  between  his 
temple  and  wrist.  Kullmann  assigned 
the  wrongs  of  the  church  as  the  reason 
for  his  act. 


The  uses  of 
adversity 


Second 
attempt  on 
Bismarck's 
life,  1874 


66 


BISMARCK 


The  Social 
Democrats 


Much  less  powerful  in  parliament,  but 
far  more  dangerous  to  the  social  and 
political  order  of  the  German  empire, 
is  the  Social  Democratic  party.  The 
great  strength  of  this  party  in  Germany 
—  in  the  election  of  1890  it  cast  nearly 
eleven  per  cent  of  the  total  vote1  —  is 
partly  due  to  the  idealistic  character  of 
the  German  mind,  but  mainly  to  the 
sudden  passage  of  the  German  people 
from  a  system  of  economic  restraint 
to  an  almost  perfect  economic  liberty. 
This  change  was  accomplished  by  a 
series  of  liberal  laws  enacted  by  the 
North  German  and  Imperial  Diets,  abol¬ 
ishing  nearly  all  restrictions  upon  trade 
and  industry  and  giving  the  laborer  full 
freedom,  but  exposing  him  also  to  the 
unchecked  influence  of  free  competition. 
All  such  transitions  are  of  course  accom¬ 
panied  by  much  suffering  and  discon¬ 
tent  ;  and  the  discontent  of  the  German 

1  In  1898  the  Social  Democrats  cast  nearly  28  per  cent 
of  the  total  vote  and  carried  about  one-seventh  of  the  seats 
in  the  Imperial  Diet. 


BISMARCK 


67 


workingmen  found  expression  in  the 
Social  Democratic  movement.  The  rapid 
growth  of  the  party,  and  the  increas¬ 
ingly  revolutionary  tendency  shown  in 
the  speeches  and  writings  of  its  leaders, 
had  already  caused  the  imperial  and 
state  governments  to  consider  the 
desirability  of  repressive  legislation, 
when,  on  May  11,  1878,  a  workingman 
named  Hodel,  who  was  shown  to  be 
connected  with  the  Social  Democrats, 
attempted  the  life  of  the  emperor.  Bis¬ 
marck  at  once  introduced  in  the  Impe¬ 
rial  Diet  an  anti-socialist  bill  of 


Repressive 

legislation 


great 


severity,  intended  to  suppress  entirely 
the  spread  of  Social  Democratic  doc¬ 
trines.  To  the  majority  of  the  Deputies 
the  bill  seemed  too  great  an  invasion  of 


the  freedom  of  assembly  and  of  the  press, 
and  its  passage  in  the  form  desired 
by  the  government  was  refused.  On 
June  2,  a  second  attempt  was  made 
upon  the  emperor’s  life  by  a  man  of 
university  education,  Dr.  Nobiling.  The 
emperor  was  seriously  injured,  and  for  a 


68 


BISMARCK 


time  his  life  was  thought  to  be  in  dan¬ 
ger.  Bismarck  promptly  dissolved  the 
parliament  and  ordered  new  elections. 
The  electors  supported  the  government, 
and  the  new  parliament  passed  the  de¬ 
sired  measures  against  the  socialists. 
The  law  was  passed  for  a  term  of  years 
only,  but  was  repeatedly  reenacted  and 
remained  in  force  until  1890.  Bismarck, 
however,  was  not  satisfied  with  repres- 


Reform  sive  measures.  He  believed  it  necessary 

.gislation  g£rjke  a{-  root  0£  £pe  trouble, 


not,  as  many  Conservatives  desired,  by 
abandoning  the  principles  of  economic 
liberty,  but  by  bettering  the  position  of 
the  workingmen.  In  accordance  with 
this  desire,  and  largely  through  his  influ¬ 
ence,  rigid  employers’  liability  laws  were 
adopted,  and  also  a  remarkable  series  of 
statutes  organizing  a  system  of  compul¬ 
sory  insurance  of  laborers  against  acci¬ 
dent,  disease  and  old  age. 


The  German 
army 


During  these  years  of  conflict  with 
the  Ultramontanes  and  with  the  Social 


I 


BISMARCK  69 

Democrats,  Bismarck  was  occupied  with 
questions  even  more  vital  to  the  new 
empire  —  questions  that  touched  the  cen¬ 
tral  points  of  political  power,  the  army 
and  the  treasury.  It  was  the  Prussian 
army  that  had  made  Germany  a  nation, 
and  the  maintenance  of  German  unity 
was  felt  to  depend  upon  the  strength 
and  efficiency  of  the  federal  army.  The 
constitution  of  the  empire  provides  that 
every  adult  German  shall  be  held  to 
military  service,  but  leaves  the  details 
of  army  organization  to  be  regulated  by 
law.  The  Conservatives  desired  that  this 
should  be  done  by  an  ordinary  law,  not 
limited  as  to  duration ;  while  the  Radi¬ 
cals  were  disposed  to  demand  an  annual 
regulation.  As  against  the  Radical  de¬ 
mand,  the  military  authorities  insisted 
that  so  complex  a  machine  as  the  Ger¬ 
man  army  could  not  be  run  from  year 
to  year  with  annual  risk  of  parliamentary 
interference.  Bismarck  himself  did  not 
desire  a  permanent  law,  because  such  a 
law,  he  thought,  would  make  any  future 


70 


BISMARCK 


The  sep- 
tennate 


increase  of  the  army  difficult.  His  atti¬ 
tude  facilitated  a  compromise,  viz.  the 
periodical  passage  of  laws  fixing  the 
strength  of  the  peace  footing  for  a  term 
of  years.  From  the  outset,  the  term 
selected  was  seven  years ;  and  at  the  close 
of  each  septennate  the  strength  of  the 
army  has  been  increased.  In  1887  the 
Diet  attempted  to  shorten  the  period  to 
three  years.  Bismarck  declared  this  an 
attempt  to  make  the  federal  army  “  a 
parliamentary  army,”  dissolved  the  Diet, 
January  14,  1887,  and  appealed  to  the 
country.  The  country  supported  the  gov¬ 
ernment,  returning  a  Diet  in  which  the 
Radical  faction  lost  two-thirds  of  its 
strength ;  and  the  new  parliament  voted  a 
new  septennate  with  a  peace  footing  of 
nearly  half  a  million.  In  1888  it  extended 
the  time  of  service  in  the  Landwehr ,  in¬ 
creasing  the  fighting  strength  of  the  army 
by  700,000  men,  and  enabling  Germany,  as 
Bismarck  said  in  his  great  speech  of  Feb¬ 
ruary  8,  1886,  to  put  a  million  men  on  each 
frontier  —  the  western  and  the  eastern. 


BISMARCK 


7 1 


During  the  first  years  of  the  new 

empire  the  imperial  treasury  derived  its 

income  largely  from  contributions  levied 

upon  the  single  states.  The  constitution 
assigned  to  the  empire  all  customs  duties, 
but  under  the  existing  tariff  these  duties 
were  quite  insufficient  to  balance  the  im¬ 
perial  budget.  The  constitution  also  gave 
the  empire  wide  powers  of  indirect  taxa¬ 
tion,  and  Disinaick  resolved  tu  utifee 
tliis^source  of  supply.  For  such  taxa¬ 
tion, the  most  available  objects  were 
spirits  and  tobacco.  An  excise  upon 
spirits  would  have  encountered  the  op¬ 
position  of  the  Conservative  landholders, 
who  are  large  producers  of  brandy ;  and 
no  measure  of  financial  reform  could  be 
carried  without  the  aid  of  the  Conserva¬ 
tives.  Bismarck  accordingly  turned  to 
tobacco,  and  demanded  either  a  monop¬ 

oly  or  a  heavy  taxation  of  the  manm- 
facture.  The  monopoly  was  his  choice. 
He  claimed  that  the  tobacco  monopoly 
would  nnt  merely  place  the  empire  in 
a  position  of  financial  independence,  but 


German 

finances 


Project  of  a 
tobacco 
monopoly 


72 


BISMARCK 


would  give  it  a  surplus  to  be  divided 
among  the  single  states.  The  states 
would  thus  be  enabled  to  reduce  greatly 
their  direct  taxes.  This  project,  how¬ 
ever,  found  no  favor  in  the  eyes  of  the 
German  Liberals.  The  manufacture  of 
tobacco  is  one  of  the  most  prosperous 
of  Germany’s  industries,  lihd  one  oT~Ttre~ 
least  concentrated.  It  is  carried  on  in~ 
thousands  of  little  factories,  and  often 
as  a  house  industry.  AccordingIy7~tKe 
National  Liberals,  who  represent  espe¬ 

cially  the  middle  class,  opposed  the 
monopoly.  For  a  time  the  leaders  of 
this  party  seemed  inclined  to  support 
some  scheme  for  taxing  the  manufacture 
Defeat  of  the  of  tobacco;  but  the  opposition  of  their 
pr°ject  constituents  ultimately  forced  them  into 
opposition  on  this  point  also.  Without 
Idle  support  of  the  National  Liberals  the 

proposed  taxes  could  not  be  carried ;  for 

the  Conservative  and  National  Liberal 
parties  constituted  the  majority  updrC1 

which  the  government  had  thus  far 

depended.  No  feasible  way  of  increas- 


BISMARCK 


73 


ing  the  imperial  receipts  was  now  left 
except  an  increase  of  the  customs  duties. 
This  involved  the  abandonment  of  the 
policy  which  the  German  customs  union 
had  pursued  from  the  outset,  and  to 
which  the  empire  had  thus  far  remained 
constant.  But  Germany  was  ready  for 
a  change.  The  theory  of  free  trade  had 
been  strongly  assailed.  Numerous  in¬ 
dustries  were  clamoring  for  protection, 
and  to  secure  a  protective  tariff  it  was 
necessary  nnly  fn  hring  a  sufficient  num¬ 
ber  of  industrial  interests  into  combina¬ 
tion.  _"5uch  a  tariff  was  passed  fuly  iTT 
1879,  by  a  combination  of  the  land  and 
the  iron  interests.  The  duties  imposed 
on  breadstuffs  and  cattle  held  the  Con¬ 
servatives  firm  in  their  allegiance  to  the 
government,  and  the  duties  on  iron  won 
the  support  of  the  Ultramontanes,  this 
party  being  strongly  recruited  from  the 
mining  and  manufacturing  districts  on 
the  Rhine.  The  National  Liberal  party 
was  temporarily  disrupted.  Incidentally, 
it  is  almost  needless  to  say,  this  tariff 


A  protective 
tariff,  1879 


74 


BISMARCK 


Colonial 

policy 


has  been  a  source  of  greatly  increased 
revenue  to  the  empire ;  and  since  its 
adoption  the  imperial  budget  has  been 
balanced  without  collecting  contributions 
from  the  states.  At  present  the  financial 
mdependence  of  the  empire  is  further 
assured  by  a  tax  upon  spirits”  voted 
by  the  strongly  governmental  Diet  of 


During  the  debates  upon  the  tariff  of 
1879  Bismarck  urged  that  the  protection 
of  German  industries  would  increase  not 
only  the  wealth  of  Germany  but  its  popu¬ 
lation  also,  and  thus  doubly  strengthen 
the  country.  Emigration,  he  argued,  was 
due  to  lack  of  employment,  and  the 
growth  of  manufactures  would  increase 
the  demand  for  labor  and  enable  more 
Germans  to  live  in  Germany.  But  the 
chancellor  did  not  expect  these  results 
from  the  simple  imposition  of  protective 
duties.  The  output  of  the  German 
factories  could  not  permanently  be  in¬ 
creased  without  an  increase  of  the  for- 


UV\ck^i.W"t^  %  HrivA..  VW^X<?<./VU 

BISMARCK  75 

eign  demand.  New  channels  must  be 
opened  to  German  trade  and  new  mar¬ 
kets  conquered  for  German  industry. 

Much  had  been  done  already  by  the 
private  enterprise  of  German  merchants ; 
much  more  could  be  done  if  their  efforts 
were  seconded  by  the  diplomacy  and 
supported  by  the  power  of  the  imperial 
government.  The  first  step  in  the  devel¬ 
opment  of  Bismarck’s  far-reaching  plans  | 
was  the  sudden  seizure  in  1884  of  a  num-  4/ 
ber  of  points  upon  the  coasts  of  Africa 
and  the  islands  of  the  Pacific  ocean. 

The  second  step  was  to  break  down  the 
exorbitant  African  claims  of  Portugal, 
and  to  open  the  Congo  to  the  commerce 
of  the  world.  This  was  done  at  the  The  Berlin 
Berlin  conference  of  1884-85.  A  further  conf^rence 
measure  contemplated  by  the  chancellor 
was  the  creation  by  imperial  subsidies 
of  German  steamship  lines  which  should 
give  the  German  manufacturers  and  mer¬ 
chants  rapid  and  direct  communication 
with  the  principal  ports  of  Africa,  Aus¬ 
tralia  and  Asia.  This  scheme  aroused 


76 


BISMARCK 


General 

results 


Foreign 
relations  of 
the  empire 
1871-90 


strong  opposition  in  the  German  parlia¬ 
ment,  and  Bismarck,  after  repeatedly  re¬ 
newing  his  demands,  obtained  only  a 
portion  of  the  desired  subsidies. 

If  we  consider  simply  the  extent  to 
which  his  direct  ends  were  realized,  Bis-' 
marck’s  conduct  of  the  internal  politics 
of  the  empire  seems  a  mixture  of  success 
and  failure.  But  if  we  consider  the  de¬ 
gree  to  which  his  ultimate  purpose  was 
achieved,  and  in  what  measure  the  cen¬ 
tral  power  was  strengthened  and  the  new 
national  union  consolidated,  his  adminis¬ 
tration,  in  its  net  result,  seems  altogether 
successful.  When  he  withdrew  from  office, 
he  left  the  empire  strong  in  arms,  inde¬ 
pendent  in  its  finances,  and  exercising  an 
undisputed  sovereignty  in  legislation  and 
administration. 

The  chancellor’s  conduct  of  German 
diplomacy  during  the  early  years  of  the 
empire  is  generally  recognized  as  alto¬ 
gether  masterly  and  successful.  In  this 


BISMARCK  77 

domain,  even  the  most  obstinate  oppo¬ 
nents  of  his  internal  administration  con¬ 
ceded  his  supremacy.  In  its  main  lines, 
his  foreign  policy  was  extremely  simple,  j 
Its  object  was  to  avert  war.  Germany 
had  obtained  what  she  desired.  She  be¬ 
longed  to  the  satisfied  nations.  She  had 
nothing  to  gain  by  further  victories  and 
much  to  lose  by  defeat.  The  chief  men¬ 
ace  to  her  peace  came,  of  course,  from 
France.  It  was  impossible  for  the  French  France 
people  to  abandon  the  hope  of  reconquer¬ 
ing  their  lost  provinces.  But  they  were 
not  likely,  as  things  stood,  to  declare  war 
without  some  strengthening  alliance.  It 
was  therefore  the  task  of  the  German 
chancellor  to  keep  France  isolated.  For 
this  purpose  he  considered  it  desirable 
that  France  should  remain  a  republic. 

The  establishment  of  a  monarchic  gov¬ 
ernment  in  France  would,  he  believed, 
make  it  easier  for  that  country  to  obtain 
allies.  The  attempt  of  the  German  am¬ 
bassador  at  Paris,  Count  von  Arnim,  to 
carry  out  an  opposite  policy  and  aid  the 


78 


BISMARCK 


Royalists,  was  the  beginning  of  the  quar¬ 
rel  between  the  two  men  which  ended 
in  Arnim’s  ruin. 

A  more  direct  means  of  preserving 
the  peace  of  Europe  was  to  hold  and 
strengthen  Germany’s  friendships.  It  was 
especially  important  to  retain,  if  possible, 
Russia  the  good  will  of  Russia.  The  friendly 
attitude  assumed  by  the  Russian  emperor 
in  1866  and  1870  had  greatly  facilitated 
the  unification  of  Germany.  But  Russia’s 
friendship  was  a  precarious  possession. 
It  rested  in  part  upon  the  insecure  basis 
of  dynastic  sympathy,  and  in  part  upon 
a  lively  expectation  of  services  to  be  ren¬ 
dered  by  Germany.  It  proved  difficult 
for  Bismarck  to  satisfy  this  expectation. 
In  1870  Germany  helped  Russia  to  set 
aside  the  treaty  of  Paris  {1856)  and  re¬ 
assert  her  supremacy  in  the  Black  sea; 
during  the  Turco-Russian  war,  in  1877 
and  1878,  Germany  observed  a  friendly 
neutrality ;  and  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin 
Bismarck,  as  “  the  honest  broker,”  endeav¬ 
ored  to  mediate  fairly  between  Russia 


BISMARCK 


79 


on  the  one  hand  and  Austria  and  Eng¬ 
land  on  the  other,  and  to  save  for  Russia 
some  of  the  fruits  of  her  victories.  But 
his  support  seemed  to  the  Russians  in¬ 
sincere.  The  ill  success  of  the  Russian 
diplomacy  was  laid  at  his  door;  and  the 
relations  between  the  two  empires  be¬ 
came  strained  and  unfriendly.  Bismarck 
at  once  opened  negotiations  with  Austria, 
and  in  1879  a  treaty  of  alliance  was  con¬ 
cluded.  This  treaty  was  published  in 
February,  1888.  It  establishes  a  defen¬ 
sive  alliance  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
peace  of  Europe.  It  is  directed,  of  course, 
against  the  two  powers  from  whom  a 
disturbance  of  the  peace  is  most  to  be 
feared — France  and  Russia.  In  1882, 
Italy,  irritated  by  the  French  occupation 
of  Tunis,  joined  the  German- Austrian 
alliance.  Russia  apparently  deemed  it 
inadvisable  to  make  head  against  this 
combination,  and  externally  friendly  re¬ 
lations  were  reestablished  between  the 
courts  of  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg.  Bis¬ 
marck,  on  his  part,  while  holding  fast  to 


German- 
Austrian  al¬ 
liance,  1879 


The  triple 
alliance,  1882 


8o 


BISMARCK 


Secret 
treaty  with 
Russia,  1884 


Bismarck 
and  the  old 
emperor 


the  Austrian  alliance,  made  every  effort 
to  avoid  a  breach  with  Russia.  From 
1884  to  1890  the  peace  of  Europe  was 
“  reinsured  ”  by  a  secret  treaty  between 
Germany  and  Russia,  in  which  each 
power  pledged  itself  to  remain  neutral 
in  case  the  other  should  be  attacked 
by  a  third  power.  It  appears  that  the 
terms  of  this  treaty  were  unofficially  com¬ 
municated  to  the  governments  of  Austria 
and  Italy,  but  that,  at  the  desire  of  Russia, 
its  very  existence  was  kept  secret  from 
France  and  the  other  powers.  From 
1884  to  1890,  Germany  supported  Rus¬ 
sia’s  diplomacy  in  the  Balkan  peninsula, 
and  Austria  acted  in  concert  with  Ger¬ 
many. 

Bismarck’s  relations  with  William  I 
had  long  been  satisfactory.  The  dis¬ 
trust  with  which  the  king  at  first  con¬ 
templated  the  rapid  resolutions  and 
apparently  rash  actions  of  his  minister 
had  long  since  disappeared :  no  distrust 
could  survive  successes  so  brilliant  and 


BISMARCK 


8l 


so  continuous.  If  in  the  long  run  Wil¬ 
liam  realized  that  it  was  not  he  but  his 
chancellor  who  was  shaping  history,  his 
mind  was  too  just  to  harbor  resentment 
and  his  nature  too  noble  for  jealousy. 
In  course  of  time,  as  Marcks  asserts  and 
as  we  may  well  believe,  William’s  confi¬ 
dence  and  gratitude  ripened  into  sincere 
affection.  After  the  establishment  of 
the  empire  no  court  intrigues,  however 
strongly  supported,  were  able  seriously 
to  shake  Bismarck’s  position.  The  alli¬ 
ance  between  the  government  and  the 
Liberals  after  1866  entailed  many  results 
which  the  emperor  did  not  like ;  but  he 
accepted  them.  The  treaty  of  alliance 
with  Austria  in  1879  seriously  distressed 
him,  because  it  seemed  to  destroy  all 
prospect  of  cordial  relations  with  Russia ; 
but  he  accepted  that,  too.  This  was  the 
last  important  conflict ;  during  the  re¬ 
maining  eight  years  of  William’s  reign 
we  hear  of  no  more  friction  between  the 
emperor  and  his  chancellor. 

The  death  of  William  I  and  the  brief 


82 


BISMARCK 


Frederick 
III,  March 
9-June  15, 
1888 


reign  of  Frederick  III  wrought  no 
change  in  the  position  or  power  of  the 
chancellor.  The  humane  and  idealistic 
Frederick  had  little  sympathy  with  Bis¬ 
marck’s  rough  and  often  cynical  realism, 
but  he  showed  no  disposition  to  dis¬ 
charge  a  minister  who  had  rendered  such 
services  to  the  dynasty  and  the  nation. 
Bismarck  had  equally  little  sympathy 
with  such  a  character  as  Frederick’s ; 
but  he  stood  ready  to  serve  the  son  as 
loyally  as  he  had  served  the  father. 
Frederick’s  posthumous  diary  exhibits  in 
the  strongest  light  this  antagonism  of 
temperaments,  and  his  own  incapacity 
to  understand  Bismarck ;  but  it  also 
shows  us  how  completely  the  stronger 
will,  when  it  chose  to  make  the  effort, 
dominated  the  weaker.  Had  Frederick 
ascended  the  throne  in  full  health  of 
body  and  vigor  of  mind,  the  struggle 
for  power  which  showed  itself  in  his 
reign  might  have  assumed  larger  propor¬ 
tions  and  a  more  acute  character;  but  it 
would  still  have  been  a  struggle,  not  be- 


BISMARCK 


83 


tween  the  king  and  his  minister,  but 
between  the  minister  and  other  wills  striv¬ 
ing  to  impose  themselves  upon  the  king. 

Whatever  peril  of  a  breach  existed  was 
thought  to  be  removed  when  William  II 
became  emperor.  The  new  ruler  was 
but  twenty-nine  years  old;  he  had  grown 
up  during  the  triumphs  of  Bismarck’s 
diplomacy ;  it  was  understood  that  he 
shared,  or  reflected,  Bismarck’s  views. 
But  it  soon  became  clear  that  the  young 
emperor  had  ideas  and  a  will  of  his  own, 
and  was  not  inclined  to  be  guided  by  an 
all-powerful  premier.  To  an  energetic 
disposition  he  added  the  conviction  of  a 
personal  responsibility  to  be  discharged 
by  personal  attention  to  all  govern¬ 
mental  affairs.  The  question  soon  arose 
whether  Bismarck,  as  president  of  the 
Prussian  ministry,  was  to  continue  to 
exercise  the  powers  of  a  premier  as  he 
understood  them,  or  whether  the  mon¬ 
arch,  to  use  Bismarck’s  expression,  was 
“  himself  to  act  as  minister-president.” 
A  Prussian  ordinance  of  nearly  forty 


William  II 
1888 


Ministerial 
vs.  imperial 
responsibility 


84 


BISMARCK 


Ordinance 
of  1852 


years’  standing  required  that  all  com¬ 
munication  between  the  king  and  his 
ministers  should  pass  through  the  presi¬ 
dent  of  the  ministry.  During  the  long 
reign  of  William  I  this  ordinance  had 
been  so  fully  observed,  in  the  letter  and 
in  the  spirit,  that  the  minister-president 
alone  was  directly  responsible  to  the 
king;  the  other  ministers  were  practi¬ 
cally  responsible  to  the  premier.  In  the 
winter  of  1889-90  Bismarck  became 
aware  that  certain  members  of  the  Prus¬ 
sian  ministry  were  working  against  him, 
and  he  promptly  demanded  that  the  ordi¬ 
nance  of  1852  be  enforced.  This  de¬ 
mand  the  emperor  met  with  a  proposal 
that  the  ordinance  in  question  should  be 
revoked.  To  this  proposal  Bismarck 
refused  his  ministerial  consent.  The 
emperor  apparently  acquiesced  in  this 
decision ;  but  he  demanded  shortly  after¬ 
wards  that  Bismarck  should  keep  him 
informed  of  all  negotiations  with  mem¬ 
bers  of  parliament.  This  Bismarck 
refused  to  promise ;  and  after  an  angry 


BISMARCK 


85 


discussion  on  March  17,  1890,  the  em¬ 
peror  demanded  Bismarck’s  resignation. 

The  immediate  cause  of  this  quarrel  windthorst 
was  an  interview  between  Bismarck  and  interview 
Windthorst,  in  which,  according  to  Bis¬ 
marck’s  friends,  Windthorst  offered  the 
chancellor  the  support  of  the  Centre 
against  the  emperor,  —  an  offer  which 
the  chancellor  declined  to  consider,  — 
while,  according  to  the  story  that  reached 
the  emperor’s  ears,  it  was  Bismarck  who 
was  seeking  such  an  alliance  against 
his  imperial  master.  Bismarck  at  first 
refused  to  resign  and  demanded  an  open 
dismissal;  but  in  response  to  a  second 
demand  he  tendered  his  resignation,  Bismarck’s 
which  was  immediately  accepted.  A  few 
days  later  the  ex-chancellor  left  Berlin  March  ^ 

1890 

amid  great  demonstrations  of  popular  — — • 
affection  and  regret.  In  1866  Bismarck 
was  upheld  by  the  king  alone  against 
almost  universal  hatred  and  distrust. 

He  had  now  lost  the  support  of  the 
crown,  but  he  had  won  the  confidence 
and  the  love  of  the  German  people. 


86 


BISMARCK 


The  quarrel  The  quarrel  between  the  ex-chancellor 
emperor  and  the  emperor  soon  became  open  and 
bitter.  In  inspired  editorials  and  per¬ 
sonal  interviews  Bismarck  subjected  the 
policy  pursued  by  his  successor,  General 
Caprivi,  to  detailed  and  often  scathing 
criticism.  It  was  notorious,  however,  that 
William  had  now  become  his  own  premier 
and  that  the  measures  fathered  by  Caprivi 
were  really  William’s;  and  the  emperor  re¬ 
torted  with  circular  notes  to  the  foreign 
powers,  explaining  that  no  weight  was 
to  be  attached  to  Bismarck’s  utterances. 
There  appeared  also  semi-official  threats 
of  prosecution  for  libel  or  for  treason, 
which  were  wisely  left  unrealized.  All 
that  the  emperor  could  do,  in  fact,  was 
to  place  Bismarck  under  a  social  ban,  as 
far  as  court  functions  and  public  cere¬ 
monies  were  concerned,  to  request  for¬ 
eign  courts  to  withhold  from  him  and 
his  family  all  social  recognition,  and  to 
withdraw  from  Bismarck’s  friends  and 
admirers  all  governmental  favors  and 
privileges. 


BISMARCK 


87 


To  the  great  relief  of  the  German  peo¬ 
ple,  this  unseemly  contest  was  ended  by 
a  public  and  formal  reconciliation.  A 
severe  illness  by  which  the  prince  was 
attacked  in  the  summer  of  1893  facili¬ 
tated  overtures  on  the  part  of  the  em¬ 
peror.  They  were  cordially  received; 
and  in  January,  1894,  amid  demonstra¬ 
tions  of  lively  popular  satisfaction,  the 
dismissed  servant  and  his  imperial  mas¬ 
ter  exchanged  visits  at  Berlin  and  Fried- 
richsruh,  with  much  of  the  state  and 
ceremony  which  surrounds  the  inter¬ 
course  of  potentates  of  equal  rank.  In 
the  following  year  the  emperor  figured 
prominently  in  the  celebration  of  Bis¬ 
marck’s  eightieth  birthday.  An  imperial 
visit  to  Friedrichsruh  opened  a  series  of 
demonstrations  which  were  protracted  for 
a  fortnight,  and  which  were  compressed 
within  that  period  only  by  the  orders 
of  Bismarck’s  physicians.  Representative 
delegations  came  from  all  parts  of  the 
empire ;  addresses  and  gifts  poured  in, 
not  only  from  Germany  and  the  German 


A  formal  rec¬ 
onciliation 


Bismarck's 

eightieth 

birthday 


88 


BISMARCK 


colonies,  but  from  every  considerable 
body  of  German-speaking  residents  in 
foreign  lands.  The  only  discordant  note 
in  this  national  festival  was  the  refusal 
of  the  Imperial  Diet,  controlled  by  Bis¬ 
marck’s  old  antagonists,  Ultramontanes, 
Particularists,  Radicals  and  Social  Demo¬ 
crats,  to  pass  a  formal  vote  of  congratu¬ 
lation  ;  but  this  refusal  evoked  so  gen¬ 
eral  an  outburst  of  popular  indignation 
that  the  incident  helped  to  emphasize  the 
reverence  and  affection  of  the  German 
people  for  their  great  statesman. 

The  closing  years  of  Bismarck’s  life 
were  passed  in  domestic  retirement, 
although  to  the  very  end  he  maintained 
a  close  watch  upon  the  course  of  con¬ 
temporary  politics  and  occasionally  ex¬ 
pressed  his  views  through  the  columns 
Death  of  the  Hamburger  Nachrichten.  He  died 
July  30,  1898,  leaving  instructions  that 
he  be  interred  without  pomp  upon  his 
estate  at  Friedrichsruh,  and  that  upon 
his  tomb  be  inscribed :  “  A  faithful  Ger¬ 
man  servant  of  Emperor  William  I.” 


BISMARCK 


89 


Before  his  retirement  from  power,  Bis¬ 
marck  had  received,  both  from  the  king 
whom  he  made  emperor  and  from  the 
people  whom  he  made  into  a  nation, 
many  substantial  tokens  of  appreciation 
and  gratitude.  After  the  conclusion  of 
the  Gastein  convention  William  I  con¬ 
ferred  upon  him  the  title  of  count,  and 
when  the  German  empire  was  established 
that  of  prince.  The  king  also  gave  him 
the  estate  of  Friedrichsruh  in  Lauenburg. 
In  1866,  when  the  government  proposed 
to  the  Prussian  Diet  the  bestowal  of 
dotations  upon  Moltke,  Roon  and  other 
generals,  the  Diet,  of  its  own  motion, 
placed  Bismarck’s  name  at  the  head  of 
the  list,  and  voted  him  the  largest  sum  — 
400,000  thalers  ($288,000).  In  1871,  in 
connection  with  a  similar  series  of  dota¬ 
tions,  the  Imperial  Diet  voted  him  750,000 
thalers  ($540,000).  In  1885,  when  the 
prince  completed  his  seventieth  year,  the 
sum  of  2,379,143.94  marks  (nearly  $571,- 
000)  was  raised  by  popular  subscription. 
The  committee  which  received  the  sub- 


Honors 


90 


BISMARCK 


Personal 

characteris¬ 

tics 


scription  expended  1,150,000  marks  in  the 
redemption  of  a  part  of  the  estate  of 
Schonhausen,  sold  by  the  prince’s  father. 
The  letter  of  presentation  declared  it  a 
fitting  thing  that  Germany,  to  which  the 
prince  had  restored  so  much  of  its  lost 
territory,  should  restore  to  the  prince  the 
lands  held  by  his  ancestors.  The  re¬ 
mainder  of  the  fund  was  converted,  at  the 
prince’s  desire,  into  a  perpetual  founda¬ 
tion  for  the  support  of  candidates  for 
appointment  in  the  higher  institutions  of 
learning  and  for  the  relief  of  the  widows 
of  teachers  in  such  institutions.  In  1890, 
in  accepting  Bismarck’s  resignation,  Wil¬ 
liam  II  conferred  upon  him  the  title  of 
duke  of  Lauenburg  and  advanced  him  to 
high  military  rank.  The  emperor  also 
offered  him,  as  a  pension,  the  continuance 
of  his  official  salary;  but  this  offer  was 
rejected. 

Bismarck  was  a  man  of  great  stature  — 
six  feet  and  two  inches,  English  measure 
—  and  of  athletic  frame.  In  his  youth  and 


BISMARCK 


91 


early  manhood  he  was  an  excellent  fencer, 
a  powerful  swimmer  and  a  tireless  rider; 
and  at  the  age  of  fifty-five  he  bore  the 
exposure  and  fatigue  of  the  winter  cam¬ 
paign  in  France  not  merely  without 
injury  but  with  positive  benefit  to  his 
health.  In  later  years  his  increasing 
weight  unfitted  him  for  physical  exertion ; 
but  his  capacity  for  protracted  mental 
labor,  always  phenomenal,  was  unimpaired 
at  the  close  of  his  public  career. 

He  possessed  strong  social  instincts 
and  great  social  talents.  The  perception 
of  the  characteristic  in  men  and  in  things, 
the  faculty  of  sketching  in  words,  the  fre¬ 
quent  wit  and  the  constant  caustic  humor 
which  made  him  one  of  the  best  of  letter- 
writers,  made  him  also  one  of  the  best  of 
talkers.  This  talent  he  turned  to  good 
account,  not  in  European  diplomacy  only 
but  in  German  politics  as  well.  Many  ques¬ 
tions  that  could  not  be  settled  by  debates  in 
parliament  were  adjusted  over  the  beer  and 
in  the  smoke  of  his  famous  parliamentary 
breakfasts  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse. 


92 


BISMARCK 


Speeches 


Writings 


He  was  not  commonly  regarded  by  the 
Germans  as  a  good  parliamentary  speaker. 
In  England  he  would  have  been  regarded 
as  one  of  the  best.  The  German  taste  in 
public  speaking  inclines  to  the  oratorical; 
Bismarck’s  manner  was  usually  conversa¬ 
tional.  The  substance  and  the  arrange- 
ment  of  his  speeches  were  excellent. 
They  were  always  adapted  rather  to  con¬ 
vince  his  hearers  than  to  excite  their  ad¬ 
miration.  They  contained,  nevertheless, 
more  quotable  sayings  and  have  enriched 
the  speech  of  Germany  with  more  quota¬ 
tions,  not,  perhaps,  than  the  writings  of  her 
great  poets  but  certainly  than  the  spoken 
words  of  any  German  since  Luther. 

His  writings  have  not  only  the  excel¬ 
lence  often  observed  in  men  of  action  — 
the  simplicity,  directness  and  vigor  of  a 
Wellington  or  a  Grant  —  they  have  in 
high  degree  a  distinctively  literary  quality 
and  charm.  The  vague  word  is  avoided, 
and  the  precise,  unique  word  is  found ; 
the  current  phrase,  that  has  lost  its  edges 
by  wear,  is  replaced  by  a  phrase  fresh- 


BISMARCK 


93 


minted  and  clean-cut;  there  is  the  unex¬ 
pected  turn  that  is  wit  without  the 
obvious  intention,  and  the  literary  sug¬ 
gestion  that  is  not  quotation;  there  is 
everywhere  the  perception  not  only  of 
the  intellectual  but  also  of  the  sensuous 
value  of  words  —  in  sum,  there  is  style. 
When  Bismarck’s  letters  were  first  pub¬ 
lished,  the  poet  and  novelist  Heyse  is  said 
to  have  thanked  God  that  that  man  had 
gone  into  politics,  “  because  he  would 
have  spoiled  our  trade.” 

The  qualities  that  distinguished  Bis¬ 
marck  as  a  statesman  were  rapid  and 
accurate  perception  of  the  central  and 
decisive  points  in  the  most  complicated 
situation  ;  tenacity  of  purpose  in  following 
his  chief  end,  combined  with  readiness  to 
vary,  with  every  change  of  circumstances, 
the  mode  of  its  pursuit ;  and  a  rare  degree 
of  moderation  at  the  moment  of  fullest 
triumph.  Of  this  last  trait  he  gave  strik¬ 
ing  evidence  in  the  terms  accorded  to 
Austria  and  to  the  Prussian  parliamentary 
opposition  after  the  victories  of  1866. 


Qualities  as  a 
statesman 


94 


BISMARCK 


Political 

methods 


Family 


In  the  earlier  stages  especially  of  his 
public  career,  Bismarck  showed  himself 
a  master  of  diplomatic  strategy,  but  where 
finesse  seemed  needless  he  often  employed 
methods  that  savored  of  brutality.  It 
should,  however,  be  remembered  that  the 
belated  political  development  of  Germany 
forced  upon  him,  in  an  age  that  is  humane 
to  the  verge  of  sentimentalism,  the  rough 
work  which  William  the  Conqueror  did 
for  England  in  the  eleventh  century  and 
Richelieu  for  France  in  the  seventeenth. 
One  great  merit  of  his  diplomacy  was  its 
general  truthfulness ;  nor  is  this  merit 
lessened  by  the  fact  that,  because  of  the 
persistence  of  an  opposite  tradition,  Bis¬ 
marck’s  frankness  was  often  more  decep¬ 
tive  than  another  man’s  lies. 

Bismarck  was  married  in  1847  to  Jo¬ 
hanna  von  Puttkammer,  to  whose  con¬ 
stant  sympathy,  unwavering  confidence 
and  watchful  care  the  prince  declared 
himself  largely  indebted  for  his  successes. 
Of  this  union  three  children  were  born 


BISMARCK 


95 


—  the  Countess  Marie,  born  in  1848,  and 
married  to  Count  Cuno  Rantzau ;  Count 
Herbert,  born  in  1849,  and  married  in 
1892  to  Marguerite,  Countess  Hoyos; 
and  Count  William,  born  in  1852,  and 
married  in  1885  to  Sibylla  von  Arnim, 
whose  mother  was  a  Bismarck.  Of  each 
of  these  unions  children  have  been  born. 
Count  Herbert,  now  the  second  Prince 
Bismarck,  was  a  member  of  the  Prussian 
cabinet  when  his  father  was  dismissed, 
and  withdrew  with  him  from  the  service 
of  the  crown.  He  has  since  sat  as  a  Con¬ 
servative  in  the  Imperial  Diet.  Count 
William  is  president  of  the  district  of 
Hanover  in  the  province  of  the  same  name. 

The  literature  dealing  directly  or  chiefly 
with  the  life  and  achievements  of  Prince 
Bismarck  is  already  very  extensive.  His 
speeches  have  been  published  in  several 
German  editions  —  the  best  is  Kohl’s,  in 
twelve  volumes  —  and  in  a  French  edition 
of  fifteen  volumes.  Many  of  his  diplo¬ 
matic  and  other  state  papers  have  been 


Bismarck 

literature 


96 


BISMARCK 


published  by  Poschinger  —  Preussen  im 
Bundestage,  four  volumes  ;  Dokumente  zur 
Geschichte  der  Wirthschaftspolitik,  five 
volumes  —  and  by  Hahn  and  Wipper- 
mann  in  Furst  Bismarck ,  five  volumes. 
Four  volumes  of  Bismarck’s  political 
letters  and  four  small  volumes  of  his  pri¬ 
vate  letters  have  also  been  printed.  It  is 
announced  that  the  prince  left  memoirs 
to  be  published  at  the  discretion  of  his 
successor.  In  Busch  —  Bismarck  und 
seme  Leute ,  Neue  Tagebuchblatter ,  Unser 
Reichs-Kanzler ,  Bismarck  und  sein  Werk 
—  the  prince  found  a  Boswell  who  kept 
a  diary  and  who  reports  much  of  the 
great  man’s  small-talk.  Bismarck’s  Frank¬ 
fort  despatches  and  his  letters  have  been 
translated  into  French ;  some  of  his  letters 
have  also  appeared  in  English.  Busch’s 
material  has  recently  been  collected  and 
published  in  English  in  two  large  vol¬ 
umes:  Bismarck :  Some  Secret  Pages  of 
his  History  (1898). 

The  best  account  of  Bismarck’s  public 
career  down  to  1870  is  that  given  by 


BISMARCK 


97 


Sybel  in  his  Begrundung  des  deutschen 
Reichs,  seven  volumes,  of  which  there  is 
an  English  translation.  Sybel’s  history 
is  based,  except  as  regards  the  years 
1867-70,  upon  the  Prussian  archives; 
and  until  these  and  other  European 
archives  are  thrown  open  to  students,  it 
will  remain  the  most  authoritative  source 
of  information.  The  fullest  study  of 
Bismarck’s  policy  after  1870  is  given  by 
Blum  in  his  Deutsches  Reich  zur  Zeit 
Bismarcks  —  a  book  largely  inspired  by 
the  prince  himself.  Blum  has  also  pub¬ 
lished  an  elaborate  history  in  six  vol¬ 
umes,  covering  Bismarck’s  entire  career: 
Bismarck  und  seine  Zeit.  Numerous 
other  biographies  of  Bismarck  have  been 
written  by  his  countrymen ;  those  by 
Hesekiel,  Muller  and  Jahnke  seem  to  be 
the  most  popular.  The  best  French  book 
is  that  by  Edouard  Simon ;  the  fullest 
English  life  is  Charles  Lowe’s  Prmce 
Bismarck ,  two  volumes,  1886.  Mr.  Lowe 
has  since  published  a  more  condensed 
biography  in  one  volume. 


H 


98 


BISMARCK 


Those  who  are  curious  to  follow  the 
changing  appreciations  of  Bismarck  as 
revealed  in  caricatures  will  find  collected 
in  one  volume — Bismarck- A  Ibtim  des 
Kladderadatsch  —  all  the  Bismarck  pict¬ 
ures  published  by  the  leading  humorous 
paper  of  Berlin,  from  the  first  appearance 
of  the  Prussian  deputy  in  1847  to  the 
dismissal  of  the  German  chancellor  in 
1890;  and  in  Grand-Carteret,  Bismarck 
en  Caricatures  (Paris,  1890),  they  will 
find  reproductions  of  one  hundred  and 
forty  cartoons  from  comic  papers  in  all 
parts  of  the  world. 

In  his  little  Bismarck-Gedenkbtich  (1888) 
Kohl  gives  a  fairly  full  Bismarck  bibliog¬ 
raphy,  and  also  a  list  of  original  paint¬ 
ings,  sketches  and  photographs  of  the 
prince.  A  relatively  complete  bibliogra¬ 
phy  by  Schultze  and  Roller  —  Bismarck- 
Literatur ,  Leipsic,  1895  —  contains  about 
six  hundred  titles.  Lemcke  and  Buechner 
of  New  York  publish  a  useful  list  of 
selected  books  and  pamphlets. 

Since  1S93  a  Bismarckjahrbuch  has 


BISMARCK 


99 


appeared,  edited  by  Kohl  and  devoted 
exclusively  to  the  study  of  Bismarck’s 
life  and  achievements. 

Modern  German  and  European  his¬ 
tories  ;  German  political  pamphlets  from 
1862  to  the  present  time;  memoirs  and 
biographies  of  the  German  statesmen  and 
generals  who  were  associated  with  Bis¬ 
marck’s  work  and  of  the  foreigners  who 
were  his  allies  or  his  enemies  —  all  these 
necessarily  deal  to  a  greater  or  less  extent 
with  Bismarck’s  career  and  constitute  a 
sort  of  secondary  Bismarck  literature. 
Among  the  works  of  the  last-mentioned 
class  —  memoirs  and  biographies  —  one 
deserves  special  mention,  not  only  because 
its  author  has  much  to  say  about  Bis¬ 
marck,  but  also  because  of  the  fairness 
and  insight  that  he  displays.  This  book, 
which  has  already  been  cited  in  the  fore¬ 
going  sketch,  is  Erich  Marcks’s  Kaiser 
Wilhelm  /. 


SCIENCE  OF  STATISTICS,  PART  I 

STATISTICS  AND  SOCIOLOGY 


By  RICHMOND  MAYO-SMITH,  Ph  D., 

Professor  of  Political  Economy  and  Social  Science  in  Columbia  College 

8vo.  Cloth,  pp.  xvi.  +  399.  $3.00,  net 


Sociology  is  the  science  which  treats  of  social  organization.  It  has  for  object  of  research 
the  laws  which  seem  to  underlie  the  relations  of  men  in  society.  It  studies  social  phe¬ 
nomena.  But  the  sociologist  meets  two  great  difficulties  ;  one  is  the  enormous  number  and 
complexity  of  these  social  phenomena,  and  the  second  is  the  lack  of  any  precise  means  of 
measuring  or  gauging  social  forces.  History  and  observation  give  us  general  knowledge 
of  these  phenomena.  In  some  directions  one  can  reach  quantitative  measurements  in 
addition  to  mere  qualitative  description.  This  is  done  by  means  of  statistics.  The  science 
of  Statistics  is  therefore  one  of  the  most  important  instruments  of  investigation  in  Sociology. 

The  object  of  this  book  is  to  show  how  Statistics  should  be  used  by  the  sociologist  and 
to  give  some  of  the  results  thus  far  attained.  In  each  chapter  special  emphasis  is  laid  on 
the  right  use  of  the  method,  and  the  ordinary  fallacies  and  misuse  of  statistics  are  carefully 
pointed  out.  The  object  is  to  furnish  the  student  of  sociology  and  the  general  reader  with 
the  most  interesting  facts  and  at  the  same  time  to  make  him  competent  to  judge  of  the  value 
of  the  evidence. 

The  material  gathered  in  this  volume  is  all  included  under  Population  Statistics.  It 
deals  with  the  classification  of  population  according  to  sex,  age,  and  conjugal  condition, 
with  births,  marriages,  deaths,  sickness,  and  mortality  ;  the  social  condition  of  the  com¬ 
munity  is  considered  under  the  statistics  of  families,  dwellings,  education,  religious  confes¬ 
sion,  infirmities,  suicide,  and  crime  ;  ethnographic  problems  are  dealt  with  under  race  and 
nationality,  migration,  population  and  land  (physical  environment),  and  population  and 
civilization  (social  environment).  The  causes  affecting  each  phenomenon,  e.g.  scarcity  of 
food,  and  crime,  are  carefully  considered  in  each  case. 

The  author  has  utilized  the  material  furnished  by  the  recent  American  and  European 
censuses  of  1890  and  1891  which  has  just  become  accessible.  This  material  will  not  be 
superseded  for  ten  years  at  least.  For  current  statistics  such  as  births,  marriages,  and 
deaths  he  has  used  the  averages  for  the  decade  1880-90  as  being  typical  rather  than  the  fig¬ 
ures  for  a  single  year.  While  the  book  is  not  a  manual  of  statistics  in  the  ordinary  sense,  it 
contains  all  the  important  facts  about  population  critically  arranged  and  analyzed.  The 
reader  is  not  sent  adrift  among  a  lot  of  tables,  but  the  relation  of  the  facts  to  each  other  is 
carefully  observed  At  the  same  time  a  topical  index  makes  the  book  useful  as  a  dictionary 
of  population  statistics. 

The  present  volume  is  issued  as  Part  I.  of  a  systematic  Science  of  Statistics,  and  is 
intended  to  cover  what  is  ordinarily  termed  Population  Statistics.  The  author  has  in  prepa¬ 
ration  Part  II.,  Statistics  and  Economics,  which  will  cover  the  statistics  of  commerce,  trade, 
finance,  and  economic  social  life  generally. 

CONTENTS . 

Introduction.  Statistics  in  the  Service  of  Sociology.  — The  Criteria  of  Statistics.  —  Method 
of  Study.  Book  I.  Demographic.  Sex,  Age,  and  Conjugal  Condition.  —  Births. — 
Marriages.  —  Deaths.  —  Sickness  and  Mortality.  Book  II.  Social.  Social  Condition 
( Families  and  dwellings  t  education ,  religious  confession ,  and  occupations').  —  The 
Infirm  and  Dependent. — Suicide  — Crime.  Book  III.  Ethnographic.  Race  and 
Nationality. — Migration.  Book  IV.  Government.  Population  and  Land  (Physical 
Environment).  —  Population  and  Civilization  (Social  Environment).  Index  by  Topics. 
Index  by  Countries. 


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FROM  THE  PRESS, 


“  Professor  Mayo-Smith’s  long-expected  work  on  statistics  is  sure  to  take  front  rank  in 
the  literature  of  the  subject  in  the  English  language.  It  is  not  a  book  of  statistical  references, 
but  is  rather  a  work  devoted  to  the  interpretation  of  statistical  data.  .  .  .  The  success  which 
greeted  Professor  Mayo-Smith’s  earlier  sketch,  ‘  Statistics  and  Economics,'  will  doubtless  be 
accorded  in  still  greater  measure  to  his  more  ambitious  effort.  The  situation  of  our  statistical 
literature  is  such  that  even  a  poor  performance  in  this  field  would  be  of  importance.  A  work 
which  has  the  scholarly  character  of  the  present  volume  can  count  upon  an  assured  success." 
—  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science. 

“  It  embodies  the  conclusions  of  a  pioneer  in  the  field,  who  has  been  lecturing  on  statistics 
for  a  dozen  years  at  Columbia  College,  and  who,  by  his  teaching  and  influence,  has  con¬ 
tributed  to  arouse  an  enlightened  interest  in  the  subject.  This  work  will  extend  and  deepen 
that  interest  among  students  of  affairs ;  and  by  providing  a  text-book,  which  might  be  used 
for  a  class  either  with  or  without  supplementary  lectures,  it  should  make  the  introduction  of 
the  subject  into  the  curricula  of  other  institutions  possible.  This  volume  contains  the  only 
full  statement  in  the  English  language  of  the  general  principles  and  conclusions  of  statistics, 
and  it  is  a  matter  of  congratulation  that  an  American  scholar  should  be  the  first  to  offer  such 
a  work  to  the  public.” —  The  Educational  Review. 

“An  exceedingly  useful  work.  .  .  .  From  a  vast  range  of  reliable  sources  Professor 
Mayo-Smith,  an  expert  in  statistical  methods,  has  brought  together  a  mass  of  ordered 
materials  which  bear  on  social  problems  ;  and  students  of  sociology  are  deeply  his  debtors. 
Many  vague  notions  and  insecure  theories  will  be  tested  by  the  yard-stick  of  this  book,  and 
no  serious  workers  can  afford  to  ignore  it.  .  .  .  It  is  a  distinct  merit  of  the  work  that  the 
data  compiled  are  arranged  in  a  way  to  excite  interest  and  lead  to  results.” —  The  Dial. 

“  No  more  important  work  bearing  on  the  subject  of  social  science  has  been  issued 
recently.  In  1890  and  1891  full  and  complete  censuses  were  taken  in  the  United  States, 
England,  Scotland,  Ireland,  Germany,  France,  Austria,  and  India,  and  Professor  Mayo- 
Smith  has  availed  himself  of  the  results  of  these  to  present  in  intelligible  and  scientific  form 
such  of  the  statistics  as  bear  directly  upon  the  most  important  and  vital  sociological  and  eco¬ 
nomical  questions  of  the  day,  which  are  pressing  themselves  home  not  only  upon  students, 
sociologists,  and  publicists,  but  upon  intelligent  men  generally.  ...  In  brief,  the  book  may 
be  accepted  as  an  authority,  and  its  value,  filling  a  place  too  long  vacant  in  the  literature  of 
sociological  science,  is  not  easily  exaggerated."  —  Boston  Daily  Advertiser. 

“  Far  from  being  an  arid  text-book,  these  statistical  facts  are  so  systematically  arranged 
and  presented,  with  such  ingenious  and  instructive  comment,  as  to  furnish  in  small  com¬ 
pass  a  vast  magazine  of  curious  facts  with  no  little  interesting  reading,  at  least  to  any  one 
taking  the  slightest  interest  in  sociology.  The  indexing  cannot  be  too  highly  commended, 
rendering,  as  it  does,  a  wide  range  of  statistics  instantly  available.” — The  Milwaukee 
Sentinel. 

“  The  work  is  a  novelty  in  American  literature,  nothing  of  the  kind  ever  having  been 
before  issued.  It  is  also  a  model  of  method  and  ought  to  be  as  safe  a  guide  as  the  mariner's 
compass  has  been  to  the  navigator  in  the  past.  .  .  .  While  the  author  has  published  a  text¬ 
book  for  the  student  and  a  guide  for  the  statistician,  he  has  also  issued  a  very  interesting 
work  for  common  perusal.”  —  The  Detroit  Tribune. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

66  FIFTH  AVENUE,  NEW  YORK 


MUNICIPAL  HOME  RULE. 

A  Study  in  Administration. 


BY 

FRANK  J.  GOODNOW,  LL.D., 

Professor  of  Administrative  Law ,  Columbia  University 
in  the  City  of  New  York. 


Cloth.  i6mo.  $1.50,  net. 


COMMENTS. 

“  Indeed,  we  doubt  if  any  author  has  achieved  such 
eminent  success  in  the  solution  of  the  difficult  problems 
of  city  government  as  the  author  of  the  present  work.” 

—  Times-Unton,  Albany,  N.Y. 

“  A  scholarly,  thoughtful,  and  independent  criticism  of 
municipal  experiences  and  the  plans  now  urged  to  better 
municipal  conditions.  .  .  .  The  volume  is  an  exception¬ 
ally  valuable  one  to  close  students  of  municipal  affairs.” 

—  Outlook. 

“Every  one  interested  in  municipal  reform,  and  the 
possibility  of  securing  honest  and  effective  government 
for  American  cities,  ought  by  all  means  to  give  studious 
attention  to  Professor  Goodnow’s  philosophical  presenta¬ 
tion  of  the  subject.”  —  Boston  Beacon. 

“  It  is  one  of  the  finest  studies  in  administration  that 
has  ever  been  offered  to  political  students.”  —  Inter-Ocean. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY, 

66  FIFTH  AVENUE,  NEW  YORK. 


MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS, 


BY 

FRANK  J.  GOODNOW,  LL.D., 

Professor  of  Administrative  Law ,  Columbia  University 
in  the  City  of  New  York. 


Cloth.  i6mo.  $1.50,  net. 


COMMENTS. 

“We  question  if  any  other  book  before  has  achieved 
quite  the  important  service  to  what  may  be  termed 
theoretic  municipalism.  .  .  .  One  that  all  those  inter¬ 
ested  in  municipal  matters  should  read.  .  .  .  Moderate 
in  tone,  sound  in  argument,  and  impartial  in  its  conclu¬ 
sions,  it  is  a  work  that  deserves  to  carry  weight.”  — 
London  Liberal. 

“  Here  is  without  doubt  one  of  the  most  trenchant  and 
scholarly  contributions  to  political  science  of  recent  writ¬ 
ing,  remarkable  for  analytical  power  and  lucidity  of  state¬ 
ment.”  —  Chicago  Evetiing  Post. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY, 

66  FIFTH  AVENUE,  NEW  YORK. 


PUBLICATIONS  OF  THE  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 


CLASSICAL  STUDIES 


IN  HONOUR  OF 

HENRY  DRISLER 

WITH  PORTRAIT  AND  ILLUSTRATIONS 

8vo.  Cloth,  pp.  viii  +  310.  $4.00,  net 


CONTENTS 

On  the  meaning  of  nauta  and  viator  in  Horace,  Sat.  I.  5,  11-23.  By  Sidney 
G.  Ashmore.  —  Anaximander  on  the  Prolongation  of  Infancy  in  Man.  By 
Nicholas  Murray  Butler.  —  Of  Two  Passages  in  Euripides’  Medea.  By 
Mortimer  Lamson  Earle.  —  The  Preliminary  Military  Service  of  the 
Equestrian  Cursus  Honorum.  By  James  C.  Egbert,  Jr.  —  References  to 
Zoroaster  in  Syriac  and  Arabic  Literature.  By  Richard  J.  H.  Gottheil. — 
Literary  Frauds  among  the  Greeks.  By  Alfred  Gudeman.  —  Henotheism  in 
the  Rig-Veda.  By  Edward  Washburn  Hopkins.  — On  Plato  and  the  Attic 
Comedy.  By  George  B.  Hussey.  —  Herodotus  VII.  61,  or  Ancient  Persian 
Armour.  By  A.  V.  WILLIAMS  JACKSON.  —  Archaism  in  Aulus  Gellius.  By 
CHARLES  Knapp.  —  On  Certain  Parallelisms  between  the  Ancient  and  the 
Modem  Drama.  By  Brander  Matthews.  —  Ovid's  Use  of  Colour  and 
Colour-Terms.  By  Nelson  Glenn  McCrea. —  A  Bronze  of  Polyclitan 
Affinities  in  the  Metropolitan  Museum.  By  A.  C.  Merriam.  —  Geryon 
in  Cyprus.  By  A.  C.  Mf.rriam.  —  Hercules,  Hydra,  and  the  Crab.  By 
A.  C.  Merriam.  —  Onomatopoetic  Words  in  Latin.  By  H.  T.  PECK.  —  Notes 
on  the  Vedic  Deity  Pusan.  By  E.  D.  Perry.  —  The  So-Called  Medusa 
Ludovisi.  By  JULIUS  Sachs.  —  Aristotle  and  the  Arabs.  By  William  M. 
Sloane.  —  Iphigenia  in  Greek  and  French  Tragedy.  By  Benjamin  DURYEA 
WOODWARD.  —  Gargettus,  an  Attic  Deme.  By  C.  H.  YOUNG. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

66  FIFTH  AVENUE,  NEW  YORK 


FROM  THE  PRESS 


**  Many  glimpses  of  fields  almost  untrodden  in  Greek  and  Latin  literature  are  given  in  this 
volume.”  —  The  New  York  Tribune, 

“  A  recent  publication  which  will  appeal  to  every  American  scholar.  .  .  .  The  papers  are 
kept  strictly  within  the  lines  of  scholarship  and  criticism  in  which  Dr.  Drisler  himself  has 
been  engaged.  On  the  part  of  the  contributors  they  are  an  offering  of  what  is  choicest  and 
best  in  their  own  profession,  a  rich  and  delightful  mosaic  of  American  scholarship,  which  will 
bear  study  part  by  part,  and  which,  in  the  combined  setting  of  the  parts,  is  an  incomparable 
tribute  to  the  incomparable  Nestor  of  our  American  Greek  schools.”  —  The  Independent. 

“  The  circumstances  of  the  issue  of  this  handsome  volume  give  it  an  emotional  interest, 
which  makes  it  a  volume  separate  and  distinct  among  the  collected  records  of  the  investiga¬ 
tions  of  scholars.  It  is  a  gathering  of  twenty-one  studies  of  classical  problems,  printed  as  a 
tribute  to  one  of  the  best-known  classical  students  of  the  present  day,  at  the  conclusion  of 
fifty  years  of  his  service  in  a  single  institution.  .  .  .  These  circumstances  give  this  volume 
an  interest  to  all  persons  concerned  with  scholarship  and  university  influences.  The  studies 
themselves,  for  the  most  part,  appeal  in  the  first  instance  to  specialists,  but  many  of  them 
have  a  much  wider  interest.  .  .  .  The  book  is  a  credit  to  American  scholarship,  as  well  as  a 
fit  tribute  to  the  honored  name  of  Professor  Drisler.”  —  The  Outlook. 

“  Entirely  apart  from  the  special  interest  which  its  contents  possess  for  the  student  of  the 
classics,  the  publication  of  this  handsomely  printed  volume  has  some  features  that  are  of  general 
significance.  It  gives  evidence,  for  one  thing,  of  the  Germanization  of  our  classical  scholars, 
not  only  in  their  methods  of  research  and  the  other  weightier  matters  of  the  law,  but  also  in 
the  minor  points  of  academic  custom  and  tradition.  In  Germany  it  has  long  been  the  practice 
for  the  friends  and  former  pupils  of  a  distinguished  scholar  to  celebrate  some  epoch  of  his 
career  by  the  publication,  in  his  honor,  of  a  collection  of  scientific  monographs  relating 
to  the  special  subjects  in  which  his  life-work  has  been  spent  and  his  reputation  won.  .  .  . 
So  far  as  the  writer  knows,  the  work  that  has  just  appeared  from  the  new  Columbia  University 
Press  —  the  first  to  be  issued  by  that  organization  —  is  the  only  one  of  the  kind  yet  published 
in  honor  of  an  English-speaking  scholar.  .  .  .  This  collection  of  monographs  is  particularly 
instructive  as  practically  illustrating  the  economic  principle  of  the  division  of  labor  applied  to 
scholarly  pursuits.  The  stock  charge  that  has  been  brought  against  the  intense  and  minute 
specialization  of  the  present  day,  is  that  specialists  in  their  devotion,  each  to  his  own  limited 
field  of  research,  lose  their  sense  of  perspective,  despise  the  equally  important  labors  of  their 
fellow-specialists,  and  come  to  feel  that  the  part  is  greater  than  the  whole.  Such  a  volume  as 
the  present  affords  a  practical  and  ample  refutation  of  that  view.  Here  we  see  investigators 
in  many  different  fields  of  study,  not  only  using  in  their  own  work  the  garnered  results  of 
other  specialists,  but  ably  and  effectively  throwing  upon  the  problems  of  other  workers  the 
special  knowledge  that  their  own  research  has  enabled  them  to  give.  .  .  .  The  appearance  of 
the  volume  is  unusually  attractive  and  reflects  credit  upon  the  Columbia  University  Press, 
whose  work  of  publication  is  thus  so  appropriately  and  so  auspiciously  begun.” —  The  Edu¬ 
cational  Review. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

66  FIFTH  AVENUE,  NEW  YORK 


923.243 


B622S 


579300 


